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RETHINKING GENDER EQUALITY IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION'S PIPELINE TO POWER: A STUDY ON
MEDIA COVERAGE OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
(PHASE I, THE INTRODUCTION WEEK)
Hannah Brenner*
Renee Newman Knake**
Three women now sit on the Supreme Court of the United States, and a fourth
recently retired, suggesting the attainment of formal gender equality. Despite this
appearance of progress, women remain significantly underrepresented in major
leadership roles within the legal profession, where they face extensive gender bias and
stereotyping. This gender bias and stereotyping is also leveraged against women who
are featured in the media, illustrated vividly by coverage of the most recent Supreme
Court nominations. Headlines from mainstream news, "Then Comes the Marriage
Question" in the New York Times or "The Supreme Court Needs More Mothers" in
the Washington Post, and from the online blog arena, "Elena Kagan v. Sonia
Sotomayor: Who Wore it Better?" in AbovetheLaw.com or "Put a Mom on the Court"
in TheDailyBeast.com, are just a sampling of those that emerged during the
nomination period for Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor, two highly accomplished,
well-qualified nominees.
The gendered nature of these and other articles led us to conduct an empirical
study using quantitative and qualitative content analysis to examine media coverage of
every Supreme Court nominee since Justices Powell and Rehnquist, a starting point
selected in light of the feminist movement's influence at the time. Our project sits at the
unique interdisciplinary intersection of law, gender studies, mass media, and political
science. This Article presents results from the first phase of data analysis, looking at
the week following a president's announcement of a nominee, and we report five
preliminary findings. In identifying these findings, we assess the gendered portrayals of
nominees to the Court, and we reflect upon how this knowledge might motivate the
resolution of gender disparity in the legal profession's pipeline to power.
* Lecturer in Law & Co-Director, Kelley Institute of Ethics and the Legal Profession, Michigan State
University College of Law; former Executive Director, Center for Women in Law, University of Texas School
of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law & Co-Director, Kelley Institute of Ethics and the Legal Profession, Michigan
State University College of Law. This Article was selected as a winner of the 2012 AALS New Voices in
Gender Paper Competition, and we thank the judges and participants for helpful suggestions. We are especially
grateful to Linda Greenhouse and Deborah Rhode for their encouragement and feedback on this project from
its beginning. We thank Kristi Bowman, Ken Dau-Schmidt, and Wenona Singel for their thoughtful comments
on early drafts. Finally, we are so very appreciative of the dedication and hard work on this project from Paul
Zube, our research assistants Heather Johnson and Abigail Rury, and the MSU Law Library staff, especially
Barbara Bean, Brent Doman, and Jane Meland.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time in history, three women sit concurrently on the Supreme Court
of the United States, and a fourth recently retired. The fact that women now represent
one-third of the nation's highest judicial body suggests the attainment of formal
equality, however, women remain significantly underrepresented in major leadership
roles within the legal profession. Gender equality exists in access to education and
most entry-level positions, but not when it comes to positions of power. Even with the
unprecedented number of women who have served on the Supreme Court, for example,
the position of Chief Justice has remained elusive. This disparity is evidenced not only
by statistics on the gender of leaders in the law, but also in the media's portrayal of
women lawyers who rise to the profession's highest ranks.
Scholars have documented the lack of women lawyers in positions of power over
time, and the most recent statistics still evidence dramatic inequality. Consider that
ninety-four percent of managing partners' in the nation's largest law firms are men, and
less than sixteen percent of equity partners2 are women.3 Women represent less than
twenty percent of general counsels in the Fortune 500,4 comprise barely twenty percent
of law school deans,5 and account for less than thirty percent of tenured law school
professors. 6 Only one-third of law review editors-in-chief in the top fifty U.S. law
schools are women.7 Women currently hold about twenty-three percent of statewide
elective executive offices, down five percent from a peak during 1999 to 2001.8
1. Most law firms elect one managing partner to oversee and govern the firm.
2. Equity partnerships are prestigious positions reserved for those holding ownership in a firm.
3. STEPHANIE A. SCHARF ET AL., THE NAT'L ASS'N OF WOMEN LAWYERS & THE NAWL FOUND.,
REPORT OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW
FIRMS 2 (2009) [hereinafter NAWL 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY]; STEPHANIE A. SCHARF & BARBARA M. FLOM,
THE NAT'L ASS'N OF WOMEN LAWYERS & THE NAWL FOUND., REPORT OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL NATIONAL
SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FiRMs 3 (2010) [hereinafter NAWL 2010
NATIONAL SURVEY]. Other studies reach a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Vivia Chen, Looking Into the Equity
Box: Women and Partnership Status, THE AM LAW DAILY (Sept. 2, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepa
d.com/amlawdaily/2010/09/womenequity.html ("First, women make up only 17 percent of partners at the
firms we surveyed, even though they have represented about 51 percent of law school graduates in the last 20
years. Second, of the women partners who work at multitier firms, 45 percent have equity status.").
4. ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW
2009, at 2 (2009).
5. Id. at 3.
6. See AM. BAR ASS'N, FACULTY INFORMATION BY GENDER 2008-2009, at 2-3 (2010), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/facultyinformationbygender.pdf (indicating that of 4,620
tenured faculty members, only 1,364 are women).
7. Women on Law Review: A Gender Diversity Report, Ms. JD (Aug. 23, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://ms-
jd.org/women-law-review-gender-diversity-report ("[W]hile overall percentages of women members of these
law journals (44.3%) and women in leadership positions (46.2%) correlates strongly to the number of women
awarded law degrees during the same time period (45.7% in 2008), the number of women editors-in-chief is
disproportionately low (33%).").
8. JENNIFER HORNE BOYTER, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, CAPITOL FACTS AND FIGURES: WOMEN IN
STATE GOVERNMENTS 1 (2010); Eagleton Institute of Politics, Facts, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS,
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast-facts/levels-of office/statewide.php (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). Only six
states currently have female governors, and in twenty-seven states no woman has ever held the position.
BOYTER, supra, at 1. Also notable is the 2010 North Carolina Supreme Court election, which resulted in a
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Nationally, the figures for women serving in Congress are even lower, at less than
seventeen percent. 9 In the judicial branch, women comprise thirty-one percent of the
judges serving on a state supreme court or its equivalent.' 0 Only five states and the
District of Columbia have a majority of women on their highest court, and many states
have only one." Even among the lawyers who argue cases before the Supreme Court,
only about fifteen percent are women.' 2 When factoring in race and ethnicity, the
picture becomes even grimmer. 13
The lack of female lawyers in positions of leadership and power was attributable
for many years to a limited pool of available women in the profession, but this no
longer is the case. Women graduate from law school in approximately equal numbers
to men, and have done so for over a decade. Since 1985 at least thirty-five percent of
all law graduates have been women. 4 Yet across the board, women remain excluded
from powerful positions in the legal profession, whether on the law review, in the
comer office, or on the bench. We certainly are not the first to make this observation.
Scholars and practitioners struggle to address the phenomenon in a variety of ways, and
one common theme pervades: women face extraordinary barriers to advancement.
Solutions remain elusive.
majority of women on the court for the first time in the state's history. Editorial, With a Majority of Women,
State's Top Court Hits Milestone, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 10, 2010, at A 10.
9. Eagleton Institute of Politics, Facts on Women in Congress 2011, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN
& POLITICS, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast-facts/levels of office/Congress-CurrentFacts.php (last visited
Mar. 5, 2012).
10. BOYTER, supra note 8, at I ("Currently, 4,521 women serve as state court judges, representing 26.4
percent of the total 17,108 positions. This includes Ill women who serve on a state final appellate jurisdiction
court .... (footnote omitted) (paragraph break omitted)).
11. Diversity of the Bench, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, www.judicialselection.us/Judicialselection/bench_
diversity/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (citing Gender Ratio Summary, in THE AMERICAN BENCH:
JUDGES OF THE NATION (Diana R. Irvine et al. eds., 20th ed. 2010)). The states with a majority of women
serving on the highest court are California, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Id.
12. Jessica Gresko, Few Women Argue Before Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at Al 4.
13. See, e.g., Diversity of the Bench, supra note II (providing statistics indicating that many states have
no minorities on their highest court); see also Susan J. Carroll, Women in State Government: Historical
Overview and Current Trends, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 442-43 (2007) (noting that although the first
woman was elected to the Ohio Supreme Court in 1922, followed by a second woman elected to the Arizona
Supreme Court in 1960, it was not until 2003 that a Latina became the chief justice of the New Mexico
Supreme Court and not until 2005 that the first African-American woman "preside[d] over a state court of last
resort"). For a comprehensive analysis addressing why "blacks have had little success breaking into the upper
echelons of the elite bar," see David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 497 (1996). Though Professors
Wilkins and Gulati wrote this article fifteen years ago, recent statistics reveal that their observations remain
true today. See, e.g., RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., NALP FOUND. & AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD: FIRST
RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY ON LEGAL CAREERS 64 (2004) (noting that median salaries for black lawyers
are generally lower than those of other groups); see also ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, FROM
VISIBLY INVISIBLE TO VISIBLY SUCCESSFUL: SUCCESS STRATEGIES FOR LAW FIRMS AND WOMEN OF COLOR IN
LAW FIRMS (2008) (providing specific strategies for law firms and lawyers to improve diversity based on
research conducted with twenty eight women of color partners in national law firms); ABA COMM'N ON
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2006) (identifying
specific barriers and obstacles facing women of color lawyers).
14. NAWL 2010 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1.
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The nation's four female Supreme Court Justices shattered one of the remaining
glass ceilings.' 5 Yet despite their individual successes, they remain subject to
significant stereotypes and bias. One place where this plays out in colorful, if not
disturbing, ways is in media coverage of nominees to the Court. Headlines from
mainstream news-"Then Comes the Marriage Question" in the New York Times' 6 or
"The Case for More Mothers" in the Washington Post,17 and from the online blog
arena, "Elena Kagan v. Sonia Sotomayor: Who Wore it Better?" in AbovetheLaw.com I8
or "Put a Mom on the Court" in TheDailyBeast.com 9-are just a sampling of those that
emerged during the nomination periods for Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor.
Criticism leveraged against the two women regarding beauty, fashion sensibility,
marriage, motherhood status, and sexuality accompanied the usual assessment of
qualifications and experience for Supreme Court nominees.
As these articles and blog posts appeared during the Supreme Court nominations
for Sotomayor and Kagan, we took notice. We clipped articles from the newspaper,
much as Sandra Day O'Connor did in the early 1970s when the press speculated about
the possibility of a woman nominee to the Court (though ultimately the nominations
went to Powell and Rehnquist).2" We exchanged links to blog posts and other online
discussions and typed lengthy emails to one another, reacting to what we read.
2
'
15. Although the number of women who have served on the Supreme Court is unprecedented, a woman
has yet to serve in the capacity of Chief Justice, a position of ultimate prestige and power. Similar to the
executive office of the United States, which has not yet seen a female president or vice-president, the position
of Chief Justice perhaps represents the ultimate glass ceiling. Despite Hillary Clinton's optimistic remark after
her unsuccessful bid for the Democratic nomination that, "[a]lthough we weren't able to shatter that highest,
hardest ceiling this time, thanks to you, it's got about 18 million cracks in it," the reality is that women have
yet to break through. Peter Baker & Jim Rutenberg, The Long Road to a Clinton Exit, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2008, at Al.
16. Laura M. Holson, Then Comes the Marriage Question, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010, at ST6 ("For the
second time in a year, a childless, unmarried woman in her 50s has been nominated to be a justice on the
Supreme Court and the critics have come out swinging.").
17. Ann Gerhart, The Case for More Mothers, WASH. POST, May 16, 2010, at B01 ("But in selecting
Kagan, Obama ensured that one key demographic would actually lose representation on the court, compared
with its membership just a few years ago: mothers, a category in which 80 percent of American women
eventually land.").
18. David Lat, Elena Kagan v. Sonia Sotomayor: Who Wore it Better?, ABOVE THE LAW (June 28, 2010,
10:41 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/elena-kagan-v-sonia-sotomayor-who-wore-it-better ("Solicitor
General Kagan decided to wear the same outfit that then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor wore to day one of her
confirmation hearings: an electric blue blazer over a black blouse.").
19. Peter Beinart, Put a Mom on the Court, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 25, 2010, 8:43 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-04-26/put-a-mom-on-the-court ("I hope Barack Obama
puts another woman on the Supreme Court. And this time, I hope it's a woman with kids.").
20. See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT
BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 40-41 (2005) ("O'Connor had been clipping news stories that
speculated about the possibility of Nixon's choosing a woman. The president had forwarded the name of
Mildred Lillie, a California state court of appeals judge, along with the name of five other potential nominees,
to the American Bar Association for its traditional advisory review.... But a month earlier, just as O'Connor
happened to be drafting her letter to the president, Nixon had confided to aides ... that he really did not want a
woman justice.").
21. After embarking on this project, we were not surprised to learn that others were engaging in similar
conversations. For example, shortly after posting an abstract for this Article on SSRN (the Social Science
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The gendered nature of the headlines and related photographs, even the particular
location of the article about a nominee on the newspaper page or the photo selected, led
us to ask a number of questions. What are the similarities and differences in subject
matter of news coverage for nominees? What sort of introduction do they receive in the
first articles that appear after their nomination is announced? Does coverage differ
between male and female nominees during their respective confirmation hearings?
How might disparate treatment in media coverage be emblematic of the gender
imbalance that persists in other positions of power within the legal profession or the
employment realm generally? Could a more systematic analysis of these media
depictions help advance the conversation about the remaining gender inequality in the
legal profession and beyond? The importance and complexity of these questions
warranted study and analysis beyond what our anecdotal clipping of articles and
exchanging of blog posts could possibly reveal. This led us to embark upon an
empirical study of the media's depiction of Supreme Court nominees with an
interdisciplinary focus, situating our work at the unexplored intersection of law,
political science, communications/media studies, sociology, and gender.
To conduct this study, we created the Supreme Court Nominee Media Collection,
which contains articles from the New York Times and the Washington Post about every
Supreme Court nominee22 since Rehnquist and Powell, who were both nominated and
confirmed in late 1971 and sworn in during the first weeks of 1972. We selected this
starting point mindful of the feminist movement's influence at the time.23
We are not familiar with any major research endeavor that attempts to evaluate
the gendered media portrayal of Supreme Court nominees in the manner contemplated
by our Media Study. In some ways this is rather surprising because "one of the most
significant public discussions of the Court happens when a vacancy on the high bench
is being filled."'24 Until very recently, however, the question of gender and the Court
was one of limited significance because there were no women on the Supreme Court to
study.25 Now that we are closer to a numerical tipping point 26 with gender
Research Network), we received an email from Linda Greenhouse, a professor at Yale Law School and former
Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times, that she recently heard her students discussing these
issues. Email from Linda Greenhouse, Professor, Yale Law School, to Hannah Brenner, Lecturer in Law,
Michigan State University College of Law (Dec. 1, 2010, 10:08 AM EST) (on file with authors).
22. In determining whether to include an individual as a nominee, we selected the men and women
whose names were submitted to Congress by the President as his official nominees. See Supreme Court
Nominations, Present-1789, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominati
ons.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
23. The Equal Rights Amendment was passed by both houses of Congress in 1972, and Roe v. Wade was
reargued before the Supreme Court in 1972, with the decision handed down in January 1973. See infra Part
II.C.4 for a discussion of the reasons for beginning the study with the Powell and Rehnquist nominations.
24. Keith J. Bybee, Will the Real Elena Kagan Please Stand Up? Conflicting Public Images in the
Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 137, 140 (2011) (citing Jennifer Agiesta,
Majority Back Kagan Confirmation as Interest Wanes, WASH. POST (July 20, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://voices.w
ashingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2010/07/majority back kagan_confirmati.html).
25. Elaine Martin, Bethany Sneed, and Claudia Petrescu make a similar observation in their study on
gender and state courts: "Th[e] gap in knowledge is certainly understandable given the historical under-
representation of women in judicial office." Elaine Martin et al., Gender and State Courts: The More Things
Change, the More They Stay the Same 1 (Apr. 20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://citation.
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representation on the Court, it is an appropriate time to explore the messages conveyed
by the media about Supreme Court nominees. There are few opportunities to gain
public glimpses into the legal profession, and it is our intent that this project will not
only contribute to an understanding of gender inequality but also that this
understanding will be used to ultimately facilitate change in the landscape for women
in the legal profession.
Using the study findings as a modem lens through which to view gender and
power in the legal profession, this project assesses bias, stereotypes, tokenism, and
double binds experienced by female lawyers as they strive to attain positions of power
in the legal profession and beyond. Our decision to focus on gender and the media's
treatment of Supreme Court nominees is not meant to suggest that race is not equally
concerning, nor to deny the complexity of interlocking forms of oppression. Indeed, a
related purpose of this project is to facilitate research and analysis of issues beyond
gender, including race and ethnicity.
27
We intend to explore the data collected through our Media Study in phases. Phase
One is devoted to analysis of coverage by major news media during the first week that
follows the announcement of a nominee by the President (i.e., the introduction week). 28
Later phases of this project may examine the same media sources during different time
allacademic.com/meta/p-mla-apa-researchcitation//3/7/6/8/pages I 37687/p 37687- .php.
26. Some scholars suggest that "at a participation rate of 35%, women cease to be 'token' employees,
and become a 'minority group' capable of affecting the culture and practices of an organisation." Hilary
Sommerlad, The Myth of Feminisation: Women and Cultural Change in the Legal Profession, I INT'L J.
LEGAL PROF. 31, 33 (1994). Sommerlad theorizes that it "may be exactly a fear of this possibility which
reduces the likelihood of women's substantial progression." Id. Indeed, Rosabeth Moss Kanter's early work on
women in organizations argued that it requires more than just one or two token minorities to change
organizational dynamics: "It would appear that larger numbers are necessary for supportive alliances to
develop in the token context." ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 238 (1977).
The shift in organizational dynamics to include a greater number of minorities is sometimes referred to as the
achievement of critical mass. "Research has demonstrated that achieving critical mass (at least one-third) of
women in leadership is essential .... " THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT, THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT REPORT:
BENCHMARKING WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP 5 (2009). Marcia Greenberger, Co-President of the National Women's
Law Center, recently spoke to this phenomenon: "With Elana Kagan's confirmation, there will be three
women Justices on the court for the first time in history, nearly thirty years after the now-retired Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor broke through the glass ceiling to become the first woman Justice. This important first for the
Supreme Court is one more step toward the time when women Justices will no longer be viewed as the
exception, but rather part of what is normal and routine." Press Release, Nat'l Women's Law Center, Judiciary
Committee Approves Kagan's Nomination: NWLC Applauds the Committee's Action, Urges the Senate to
Vote Quickly (July 19, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/udiciary-committee-approves-kagans-nomin
ation.
27. We intend to explore intersections of gender and race/ethnicity in our future work. For a fascinating
analysis of African-American press coverage during the Clarence Thomas nomination, see Kathleen Fearn-
Banks, African-American Press Coverage of Clarence Thomas Nomination, 15 NEWSPAPER RES. J., 98, 112
(1994) (concluding that in "coverage of Thomas, the newspapers' tradition of support of African Americans
was challenged by the tradition of crusading for civil rights").
28. We focused on this period for our first phase of research because the sample offers a sufficient body
of data to conduct a rigorous content analysis and also allows us to contrast media coverage between the
introduction period and other points in time during the nomination process. Selection of this time period is
supported in the literature. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of use of the
introduction week time period.
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periods, like the confirmation hearings or the full period from the announcement of the
nomination until the date of confirmation or withdrawal, as well as address additional
media sources, such as online blog coverage. The results from Phase One are addressed
in this Article. We plan to take up the results from the next phases in future writing.
Our Media Study invites the reader to rethink gender equality in the legal
profession by examining what the media's depiction of Supreme Court nominees
reveals about the pipeline to power. This Article proceeds as follows. Part II situates
our work in the existing literature that surrounds the multiple points of intersection
inherent in this project. We survey scholarship from the disciplines of law, political
science, communications/mass media, sociology, and gender. Our work is particularly
informed by academics that have written extensively about the various kinds of bias,
stereotypes, and double binds29 experienced by female professionals, and especially
female lawyers, as they endeavor to advance their careers. Additionally, we discuss the
gendered structures of reporting and news media, and we explore the ways in which
researchers and scholars have grappled with the intersections of gender and judging.
We then examine literature on the effects of media and media coverage of the Supreme
Court as well as the confirmation process generally. Part II also provides an overview
of the project, and explains how we went about the creation of a unique dataset for
conducting a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative content analysis the media's
depictions of Supreme Court nominees.
Part III offers preliminary observations from Phase One of the Media Study,
which focused on the way that news media introduces the nominee to the public. To
capture this, we relied on data collected from coverage during the first seven days after
the nomination is announced and reflected upon how this data supports or refutes a
series of hypotheses that we devised when embarking on this study. We identified five
preliminary findings that emerged during the introduction week:
" Preliminary Finding 1: Female nominees receive more
coverage (in terms of quantity and length of articles) than
male nominees during the introduction week.
" Preliminary Finding 2: The gender or sexuality of female
nominees is mentioned more frequently than the gender or
sexuality of male nominees during the introduction week.
" Preliminary Finding 3: The limited sample of articles tends
to show that the appearance of female nominees is
mentioned more frequently than the appearance of male
nominees, but more data is needed.
* Preliminary Finding 4: The limited sample of articles from
the introduction week reveals that the family life of female
29. The term "double bind" was described in the 1980s by philosopher Marilyn Frey as referring to
"situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty, censure or
deprivation." MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 2 (1983). More
recently, communications scholar Kathleen Hall Jamieson developed a comprehensive framework of the
myriad ways in which double binds manifest for women. See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, BEYOND
THE DOUBLE BIND: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP (1995).
2012]
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nominees tends to be mentioned more frequently than the
family life of male nominees, but more data is needed.
Preliminary Finding 5: The articles are more likely to be
written by male journalists than female journalists during
the introduction week.
These findings provide a framework for rethinking equality in the legal
profession's pipeline to power and establish the groundwork for the next phases of our
content analysis.
II. THE SUPREME COURT NOMINEE MEDIA STUDY
A. Literature Review
To appreciate the novelty and significance of our preliminary findings, we first
must situate the Media Study in the context of existing scholarship on specific
characteristics of women's advancement in the legal profession, the role of gender in
the production and substance of media, the intersections of gender and judicial
decision-making, and coverage of the Supreme Court.
Our observation that women shattered the glass ceiling by reaching positions once
thought unattainable, yet remain subject to significant stereotypes and bias, is certainly
not new. Scholars and practitioners alike struggle to explain this phenomenon and to
develop innovative solutions. Numerous conferences, research studies, books, and
articles are devoted to the issue, whether in law, political science, communication
studies, or other fields. 30 For example, law professor and founding director of the
University of Maryland's Women, Leadership, and Equality Program, Paula Monopoli,
proposes a radical rethinking of judicial selection to the Supreme Court through
implementation of statutory reform or a constitutional amendment to require gender
parity.31 As another example, a group of the nation's leading women lawyers employed
a different approach while gathered for the inaugural Women's Power Summit on Law
30. Deborah Rhode and Barbara Kellerman make a similar point in their article, The State of Play, where
they observe that "[w]omen's underrepresentation in positions of power generates an increasing array of
committees, commissions, consultants, centers, conferences, and commentary." Deborah L. Rhode & Barbara
Kellerman, Women and Leadership: The State of Play, in WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 1 (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 2007) [hereinafter WOMEN AND
LEADERSHIP]. For a small sample of conferences devoted to women, power, and leadership in the legal
professions, see MONA HARRINGTON ET AL., ADVANCING WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION: ACTION PLANS FOR
WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIATIONS 3 (2007); Women's Power Summit on Law & Leadership (Apr. 29, 2009),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/cwil/cwl-events/2009-summit/schedule.html. Cited throughout this Article
are many of the research studies, books, and articles written on the subject as well.
31. Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and Justice: Parity and the United States Supreme Court, 8 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 43, 46-48 (2007). Other scholars have taken a different approach. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon,
Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A Re-examination, 21 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 297, 336-38 (2010) (suggesting that the focus on gender parity is misguided, arguing instead for the
addition of judges who have a feminist ideology). Dixon acknowledges feminists' desire for equal numbers of
women in the judiciary but concludes that "feminists must also weigh these benefits associated with the mere
presence of a female justice on the Court against the importance of ajustice's substantive approach to issues of
central concern to feminists, such as abortion, pay equity, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and an
ongoing dialogue about the meaning of gender equality under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 336.
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and Leadership in 2009.32 They drafted a blueprint for change, the Austin Manifesto for
Women in Law, outlining a series of principles and pledges toward the goal of
achieving "gender parity in positions of leadership, influence, and responsibility in the
legal profession." 33
One area entirely unexplored with respect to its bearing on the gender disparity in
legal positions of power is the media's coverage of the Supreme Court. Political
scientists and communication scholars have long examined the interplay of gender,
media, and politics. Their focus, however, has been primarily on elected legislative,
gubernatorial, and presidential candidates, exploring issues like how the media affects
political campaigns, voting behavior, and intricacies of serving in elective office.
3 4
Only occasionally do they pay attention to the judiciary, usually in the context of state
judicial elections. 35 Political science professor Sally Kenney observes that "[r]eview
essays on women and politics, textbooks, and even the editorial boards of our journals
32. The Summit, convened by the Center for Women in Law at the University of Texas School of Law
in April 2009, included managing partners from the nation's largest law firms, general counsels from Fortune
500 companies, state supreme court justices, federal district court judges, law school deans, state bar
presidents, and other powerful women lawyers. See Center for Women in Law, Women's Power Summit on
Law and Leadership, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN SCH. OF LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/cwil/cwl
-events/2009-summit/schedule.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
33. UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR WOMEN IN LAW, AUSTIN MANIFESTO ON WOMEN IN LAW 2
(2009), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/cwi/cwl-events/2009-summit/austin-manifesto.pdf.
Signatories to the Manifesto include prominent leaders like Linda Addison, partner in charge, Fulbright &
Jaworski L.L.P. (New York); Catherine Lamboley, former general counsel and vice-president, Shell Oil
Company (Lamboley was the first woman to serve as general counsel at Shell, and her tenure is remembered
for its groundbreaking leadership surrounding diversity issues); Ilene Lang, CEO, Catalyst, Inc., an
international organization that works to expand opportunities for women and business; former Chief Justice of
the Arizona Supreme Court, Ruth V. McGregor; Cynthia Nance, former Dean of the University Arkansas-
Fayetteville Law School (Dean Nance was the first woman and first African-American dean at Arkansas). A
full list of signatories to the Manifesto can be found at http://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/cwil/events/2009-
summit/austin manifesto.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
34. See, e.g., KIM FRIDKIN KAHN, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF BEING A WOMAN (1996). Kahn's
research explores how gender stereotypes affect political campaigns. By analyzing news coverage, campaign
advertisements, and surveys of voters, she attempts to answer the question of why so few women are
represented in political positions of power. For other discussions on issues of media and press coverage of
women candidates versus their male counterparts, see DIANNE G. BYSTROM ET AL., THE MILLENNIUM
ELECTION: COMMUNICATION IN THE 2000 CAMPAIGN (Lynda Lee Kaid et al. eds., 2003) (exploring media
coverage of campaigns and candidates' own advertising in the 2000 elections); ERIKA FALK, WOMEN FOR
PRESIDENT: MEDIA BIAS IN NINE CAMPAIGNS 15 (2d ed. 2010) (concluding that "[piress coverage [of women
candidates] is often biased and prejudiced and not much better today than in 1872"); Dianne Bystrom & Lynda
Lee Kaid, Are Women Candidates Transforming Campaign Communication?: A Comparison of Advertising
Videostyles in the 1990s, in WOMEN TRANSFORMING CONGRESS 146, 147 (Cindy Simon Rosenthal ed., 2002)
(analyzing and comparing male and female congressional candidates' television commercials for tone,
appearance, and issues); Pippa Norris, Introduction to WOMEN, MEDIA, AND POLITICS 1 (Pippa Norris ed.,
1997) (exploring the question whether "media coverage of women in America reinforces rather than
challenges the dominant culture, and thereby contributes toward women's marginalization in public life").
35. Much of the work done on the judiciary surrounds state judicial campaigns. See, e.g., Elaine Martin,
Feminist Judges: Challenging the Status Quo, in THE IMPACT OF WOMEN IN PUBLIC OFFICE 205 (Susan J.
Carroll ed., 2001).
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tend to include law and courts as, at best, an afterthought or leave it out altogether."36
Academics in law and gender studies have also examined these issues, but primarily
emphasize the gender disparity on the ground, looking, fbr example, at the number of
women holding certain positions in legal employment generally or, more recently,
questioning the statistical disparity in positions of leadership and power.
Studying the media's depiction of Supreme Court nominees is fruitful for many
reasons. First, this study is important because "citizens utilize the mass media as a
method of learning about and participating in the activities of their government,"
including citizens' understanding of Supreme Court nominees. 37 Second, the
nomination process has become a high stakes game for multiple parties to the process,
including the nominees themselves, the White House, and the Senate,38 as well as the
media itself.39 In other words, the nomination process has "transformed into a media-
oriented process. '40 Third, the media holds the power to shape if not alter the course of
a nomination.41 For example, "[t]he Senate Judiciary Committee could effectively
ignore Anita Hill's charges concerning Clarence Thomas before they became public
knowledge, but certainly not after."4 2 Our data evidenced that the media also played a
notable role in derailing the confirmation of nominees Robert Bork and Harriet Miers.
Despite the value in such possible investigations, our focus is not directed
specifically at any of these ends. Rather, we intend to show that an empirical
assessment of the media's attention to Supreme Court nominees can play an integral
role in advancing the conversation about gender and the legal profession's pipeline to
power, as well as understanding why equality in this domain has yet to be achieved.
The legal profession's power pipeline, as we conceive of it, builds on the well-
established pipeline metaphor, which refers to the process by which women enter
politics or the professions. The traditional conception of the pipeline is largely
36. Sally J. Kenney, Critical Perspectives on Gender & Judging, 6 POL. & GENDER 433, 434 (2010)
(discussing how the study of gender and courts are at the margin "within the discipline and the subfields of
both women and politics and law and courts").
37. ELLIOT E. SLOTNICK & JENNIFER A. SEGAL, TELEVISION NEWS AND THE SUPREME COURT: ALL THE
NEWS THAT'S FIT TO AIR? 2 (1998).
38. See Richard Davis, Supreme Court Nominations and the News Media, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1061, 1061-
65 (1994) (exploring the new roles that media, interest groups, and public opinion play in relation to the
Supreme Court nomination process).
39. Id. at 1065 ("The process also has been ratcheted up for the press as well. Supreme Court
nominations are major news stories designed to capture public interest for several weeks or months. Public
interest soars when the nominee is controversial.").
40. Id. at 1077.
41. See, e.g., Levon Chorbajian & Larry Beeferman, Selling Supreme Court Nominees: The Case of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, CRITICAL Soc., Oct. 1997, at 3, 4 (arguing that "the media presentation of Justice Ginsburg
was a manufactured one largely consistent with the interests of corporate and government elites").
42. Davis, supra note 38, at 1072, 1077 ("Another new force, then, is the media itself, not just as a
vehicle for others but as an independent influence. The news media do not serve merely as a filter for the
views of other actors in the process. The organizational and professional imperatives which govern the news
media shape news gathering and reporting."); see also Bybee, supra note 24, at 153 ("The newspaper coverage
of the Kagan confirmation process explicitly raised this prospect of a significantly delegitimized judiciary.
After Kagan was confirmed by the Senate, Curt Levey of the Committee for Justice, a group that opposed
conftrmation, argued that political perceptions would continue to haunt Justice Kagan on the bench.").
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numerical, suggesting that a sufficient "supply" of women will eventually result in
gender parity.
Our power pipeline theory suggests that it takes far more than numerical
representation to shift the course of gender representation. It is not enough that women
simply be present in the pipeline or occupy a specific numerical percentage of a given
profession. It also matters how women who have advanced in the pipeline are
perceived, which includes how they are depicted in the media. We theorize that gender
stereotyping and bias levied against women who have successfully navigated the power
pipeline systemically undermines the efforts of others, explaining, at least in part, the
disparate numbers in positions of power notwithstanding an equal number of women
graduating from law school and entering the profession. Our Media Study lays an
important foundation for evaluating this theory by documenting in a comprehensive,
methodical way the gendered treatment of Supreme Court nominees by the media.
1. Women's Advancement in the Legal Profession
Scholars have theorized, researched, and written about the inequalities facing
women in the profession for many years. A comprehensive body of literature has
evolved about issues of formal equality or the obvious, explicit barriers that stood in
the way of women's full participation in law. Among the most obvious barriers were
the outright refusals to admit women to law school or to the practice of law. Myra
Bradwell famously challenged the State of Illinois when it refused to admit her to the
bar.43 When O'Connor sought employment after law school, she was only offered a
secretarial job at a law firm.4 4 Harvard Law School's doors remained closed to women
until 1950,45 and Washington and Lee was the last law school to admit women in
1972.46 And, of course, not until 1981 did a woman finally sit on the Supreme Court.
47
After eradication of these formal barriers, it was widely believed that women's
advancement in the profession was just a matter of time. 48 As an illustration, a news
article appearing in the New York Times on the same day that Rehnquist and Powell
were nominated to the Court lamented the small talent pool of women from which the
43. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), affg In re Bradwell, 55 111. 535 (1869). As historian Joan
Hoff observes, the Bradwell decision was significant for two major reasons:
In the first place, it dealt with the extent to which the individual states could abridge the privileges
and immunities of local citizens, including women. Secondly, since Bradwell also addressed the
question of the right of women to practice as lawyers, it indicated the degree of willingness of the
legal profession and judiciary to open their ranks to women.
JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER & INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 161 (1991).
44. BISKUPIC, supra note 20, at 28.
45. Law School Will Accept Women Students in Fall, THE HARVARD CRIMSON, Oct. 10, 1949,
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1949/10/10/law-school-will-accept-women-students.
46. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 50 (2d ed. 1993).
47. The federal judiciary first opened to women in 1934 when President Roosevelt appointed Florence
Allen to the Sixth Circuit. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Laura W. Brill, Women in the Federal Judiciary: Three
Way Pavers and the Exhilarating Change President Carter Wrought, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 281,283 (1995).
48. Hilary Sommerlad calls this the "trickle up" theory, meaning that "[t]he absence of women at the top
of the legal profession in general has been explained as simply due to their relatively recent participation in
large numbers; top jobs will be attained in time." Sommerlad, supra note 26, at 34.
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President had to choose his nominees. The reporter predicted that the future would
surely yield more women in the legal pipeline and thus, "the pool may contain
hundreds rather than merely dozens of women because the number of women entering
the legal profession and the number who appear headed for influential positions within
it have started to grow very rapidly. '4 9 The initial focus for the women's movement
addressed "quotas, refusals to hire women ... and gaining entry for women on the
same terms as men." 50 This emphasis did not, however, achieve the desired "effect of
affording women equal status and participation in the profession."
51
a. The Pipeline Myth
The reporter's optimistic prediction in 1971 about the legal pipeline's potential for
women proved wrong. Over forty years later, proportionality in the pipeline remains
unachieved. Unfortunately, "[tjhe assumption that the flow of women through the
career pipeline would naturally lead to proportionate representation of women was not
realized. '52 Without more than a cursory look, however, some may fail to see that a
problem persists. After all, women are present in almost all facets of the law, and
occupy positions of leadership as law firm partners, law school deans, and Justices on
the Supreme Court. The public face (and marketing brochures/websites) of law firms
may include women and minority attorneys, and suggests a balanced workforce.
Almost every large law firm today has a diversity initiative devoted to addressing
equality for women and minorities in the firm.53 Yet the statistics document another
story, one that is borne out in media coverage of powerful female attorneys.
In politics, the pipeline problem has been similarly documented. 54 For example, as
political scientists Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox describe it, "[t]he basic
implication of the 'pipeline' explanation is that as more and more women come to
occupy the careers that are most likely to lead to political candidacies, we can assume
that more and more women will run for office, contest open seats, and face no
discrimination at the polls." 55 As in other contexts, this pipeline theory has not been
realized: "If change continued at the present rate, it would take more than 300 years
before men and women would be represented equally in Congress." 56 Although women
have certainly made progress over the preceding years in gaining a more significant
49. Eileen Shanahan, President Bypasses Women for Court; Talent Pool Small, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
1971, at 1.
50. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Women and the Legal Profession, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, WOMEN
AND THE LAW: CRITICAL ESSAYS, RESEARCH AGENDA, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 625, 639 (Betty Taylor et al. eds.,
1999).
51. Id
52. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, FAIR MEASURE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY
EVALUATIONS 16 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter FAIR MEASURE].
53. NAWL 2010 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 5. As this report suggests, however, the
effectiveness or impact of such initiatives has not been studied or evaluated. Id.
54. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 13, at 444--45 (discussing the "leveling off" of the number of women in
state government).
55. JENNIFER L. LAWLESS & RICHARD L. FOX, IT TAKES A CANDIDATE: WHY WOMEN DON'T RUN FOR
OFFICE 26 (2005).
56. KARIN KLENKE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: A CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 17 (1996).
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presence in state politics, "the leveling off of women's numbers among statewide
elective officials and state legislators in recent years is a puzzling, and for many a
troubling, development."57
Other scholars have looked at the pipeline in the academy.58 A recent study
conducted on women in academia reveals "[t]his disparity in numbers between men
and women is both striking and extremely troubling, since-as the aggregate data
suggest-this disparity represents a problem of advancement and not an absence of
candidates." 59 And some have played with the pipeline metaphor, adding descriptors
like the "leaking pipeline" to capture women's exit from the process.
60
b. Visibility and Tokenism in the Pipeline
In law, the pipeline may indeed be leaky, but women nonetheless enter the
profession and have ascended, in limited numbers, to occupy positions of power. The
three female Justices sitting on the Supreme Court today are a great illustration that
power is not altogether elusive. So what exactly is the problem? Law professor and
director of the Stanford Center on the Legal Profession, Deborah Rhode, describes it
this way: "Women's increasing representation and visibility in the profession is taken
as evidence that 'the woman problem' has been solved. A widespread assumption is
that barriers have been coming down, women have been moving up, and it is only a
matter of time before full equality becomes an accomplished fact. ' '6
Rhode first described the phenomenon of denying that anything is amiss as the
"no problem problem" in the late 1990s.62 Legal scholar and sociologist Hilary
Sommerlad offers a similar perspective. Her research demonstrates ways that the
"beliefs and cultural practices" of what she terms "gendered closure" have "remained
after explicit exclusion of women disappeared. '63 She explains that "the profession
continue[s] to be conceptualised as one practised by men,'64 but it becomes difficult to
quantify or even identify the impact of this conceptualization. "One of the key
problems in theorising the position of women in the profession" according to
Sommerlad, "is to define the exact point at which the profession can be said to cease to
57. Carroll, supra note 13, at 444-45 ("At a minimum, the leveling off is evidence that increases over
time are not inevitable; there is no invisible hand at work to insure that more women will seek and be elected
to office with each subsequent election.").
58. See, e.g., AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS'N, WOMEN'S ADVANCEMENT IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (2004);
Kristen Renwick Monroe & William F. Chiu, Gender Equality in the Academy: The Pipeline Problem, 43 POL.
SCI. & POL. 303 (2010).
59. Monroe & Chiu, supra note 58, at 306.
60. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Difference "'Difference" Makes, in THE DIFFERENCE
"DIFFERENCE" MAKES: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP 7 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2003) [hereinafter THE
DIFFERENCE "DIFFERENCE" MAKES] ("In short, the pipeline leaks, and if we wait for time to correct the
problem, we will be waiting a very long time.").
61. Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1001, 1001 (2002).
62. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKINGOF SEX: THE DENIALOF GENDER INEQUALITY 1-2 (1997).
63. Sommerlad, supra note 26, at 31.
64. Id.
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be gendered, and how this 'gender-neutral' state will manifest itself.' 65 Misperceptions
about gender parity result as a consequence.
One explanation for these misperceptions comes from a "tendency to overestimate
the proportion of a minority group present in a given population;" 66 this phenomenon
has been characterized as "visibility bias."67 When women occupy positions of
leadership or power within a law firm, on a court, or in another sector of the legal
profession, it is not uncommon for others to perceive them as tokens. Professor of
organizational leadership and head of the Leadership Development Institute
International, Karin Klenke, explains that "[w]omen in leadership roles share many of
the structural characteristics of tokens: they are highly visible, public individuals who
attract attention with anything they do; as such, they are stand-ins for all women,
symbols of how women behave and perform as leaders."6 The consequence, however,
is that "[a]s tokens, women leaders are different in status from other members of their
work group." 69 At the same time, as Professor Ann Bartow notes, "[w]hile women are
invisible in some environments, they are viewed with significant distortion in others."
70
The problem with tokenism is that it results in this distortion, where "[t]oken leaders
find themselves in the organizational limelight; their actions and moves are constantly
scrutinized, and they are faced with pressures that result from the application of
65. ld. at 33.
66. Rosemary Hunter, Discrimination Against Women Barristers: Evidence from a Study of Court
Appearances and Briefing Practices, 12 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 3, 15 (2005) (citing an example from her
research on discrimination against female barristers in Australia, Hunter reveals how one solicitor estimated
that between twenty to thirty percent of the barristers he selected in his work were female, when the actual
figure was closer to ten percent, which resulted in solicitors believing they were giving women ample
opportunities); see also KANTER, supra note 26, at 210 (discussing the attention derived from being a token in
a field dominated by others, resulting in your presence being more well known).
67. Hunter, supra note 66, at 15; see also KANTER, supra note 26, at 281-84 (noting that women's
success in traditionally male occupations hinges on a numerical shift in their representation beyond mere
tokenism). For a more contemporary take on Kanter's work, see Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen,
Men and Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating Kanter's Legacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41 (2000).
Chambliss and Uggen recently found some support for Kanter's hypothesis in limited contexts. Kanter's
original research did not situate the redistributive hypothesis in the context of increased minority
representation in senior leadership positions; consistent with the popular theories of that era, she was most
concerned with the overall numerical composition of a workforce and not with whether minorities occupied
positions of power within the organizational hierarchy. According to Chambliss and Uggen, "the chief
mechanism of redistribution appears to be increased minority power." Id. at 62 (emphasis omitted). In Kanter's
view, once women's aggregate percentage in the workplace increases, problems with tokenism dissipate and
minorities tend to fare better; this theory is well known as Kanter's "redistributive hypothesis." Id. at 43; see
also Robin J. Ely, The Power in Demography: Women's Social Constructions of Gender Identity at Work, 38
ACAD. MGMT. J. 589, 625 (1995) (revisiting Kanter's hypothesis through quantitative and qualitative analysis
of women in law firms and finding that sex-based stereotypes are more pervasive in law firms where women
are absent from leadership positions); Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring:
Deconstructing and Reconstructing Workplace Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 923,
934 (2001) (suggesting that other studies have similarly found that merely adding more women to the
institution will not result in redistribution unless they occupy positions of power; their location within the
workplace is key).
68. KLENKE, supra note 56, at 176.
69. Id.
70. Ann Bartow, Some Dumb Girl Syndrome: Challenging and Subverting Destructive Stereotypes of
Female Attorneys, 11 WM. & MARY J, WOMEN & L. 221, 242 (2005).
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performance standards that are only applicable to tokens." 71 As such, "[m]any token
women have reported that they must work twice as hard as their male colleagues to be
considered competent" 72 Additionally, "token status may also contribute to differences
in leadership style by enhancing women's visibility and by lowering the likelihood that
they will be members of the in-group, a combination that fosters sex stereotyping."
73
c. Gender Bias in the Pipeline
In their search for explanations about women's underrepresentation in positions of
leadership and power, scholars from a variety of fields like law, communication
studies, political science, and sociology largely agree that stereotypes and bias play a
significant role in the perpetuation of inequality.74 How these scholars theorize about
and contextualize bias varies, though most agree that today's bias against women in the
legal profession manifests in subtle, often implicit ways.75 As law professor Martha
Chamallas has written, "[t]he new scholarship on tokenism, stereotyping, and glass
ceilings suggests that updated versions of occupational and job segregation are now
held in place by cognitive bias and workplace structures that replicate patterns of the
past, even when those in power harbor no antipathy toward excluded groups."
76
Gender stereotypes about women's appearance, behavior, and choices are
pervasive on a societal scale, and are particularly prevalent in the legal profession.
Sociologist Elizabeth Gorman observes that "[g]ender stereotypes are cultural
constructs, shared at the societal level, that describe what men and women are 'known'
to be like."77 Stereotypes tend to strongly influence and impact how individuals
71. KLENKE, supra note 56, at 176.
72. Id.
73. Barbara Reskin, What's the Difference? A Comment on Deborah Rhode's "The Difference
'Difference' Makes", in THE DIFFERENCE "DIFFERENCE" MAKES, supra note 60, at 63 (internal quotation
marks and internal punctuation omitted).
74. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law Firms,
24 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1050 (2011); see also Mark D. Agars, Reconsidering the Impact of Gender
Stereotypes on the Advancement of Women in Organizations, 28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 103, 106 (2004) (noting
that the effect of gender stereotypes on women in the workforce is cumulative). Many additional possible
reasons proliferate the literature. See, e.g., KLENKE, supra note 56, at 182-83 (discussing how informal
networks like mentoring and networking within organizations operate as structural barriers to women's
advancement); Rhode, supra note 60, at 7 (identifying three major barriers to women's advancement as
"traditional gender stereotypes, inadequate access to mentors and informal networks of support, and inflexible
workplace structures").
75. See, e.g., FAIR MEASURE, supra note 52, at 16 ("Studies show that although explicit stereotyping
('women are not smart enough to be lawyers') has fallen sharply since the 1970s, implicit, unacknowledged
bias ('mothers of young children are less committed to their jobs') has changed very little."); see also SUSAN
EHRLICH MARTIN & NANCY C. JURIK, DOING JUSTICE, DOING GENDER: WOMEN IN LEGAL AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE OCCUPATIONS 126 (2d ed. 2007) (characterizing today's gender bias as "second generation bias"
which is free from explicit exclusionary practices). Experts observe that "[g]ender bias today typically does
not take the form of misogyny and does not include the explicit opinion that the law is not a suitable profession
for a woman. Gender bias today is often subtler." FAIR MEASURE, supra note 52, at 16.
76. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 186-87 (2003).
77. Elizabeth H. Gorman, Gender Stereotypes, Same-Gender Preferences, and Organizational Variation
in the Hiring of Women: Evidence from Law Firms, 70 AM. Soc. REV. 702, 703 (2005).
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perceive one another, 78 and are sometimes referred to as "descriptive shortcuts applied
to categories of people." 79 As Professor Klenke explains, "[a]lthough stereotypes may,
in fact, often be based on a grain of truth, in reality they more often conceal than they
reveal. '80 Stereotypes can be further broken down into two categories: descriptive and
prescriptive stereotypes.8' According to Joan Williams, law professor and director of
the Center for WorkLife Law, "[a] descriptive stereotype describes how an individual
is presumed to behave .... [P]rescriptive stereotypes prescribe how women (or men, or
mothers) should behave."8 2 Thus, legal ethics scholar Eli Wald concludes, "[t]he
existing literature correctly identifies gender stereotypes as an important factor
explaining the glass ceiling effect and the underrepresentation of women lawyers in
prestigious segments of the legal profession."8 3 Professor Klenke suggests that the
media's coverage of women in leadership positions often occurs in a "stereotypical
manner."84 Indeed, our own Media Study reveals a proliferation of bias and
stereotypes;8 5 we use the media's portrayal of women on the Supreme Court as a way
to illuminate what women lawyers encounter in their individual professional lives.
Stereotypes also play into the construct of "double binds" facing women in the
legal profession. Ideas about how women are supposed to act conflict with how they do
act. Described originally by legal philosopher Marilyn Frye in her seminal work The
Politics Of Reality,8 6 others, like communication scholar Kathleen Hall Jamieson, have
devoted significant attention to describing the "binds that tie."87 Jamieson identifies
five types of binds88 that are used "by those with power against those without,
8 9
thereby interfering with women's advancement in the workforce.
78. Id.
79. KLENKE, supra note 56, at 165.
80. Id.
81. Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender
Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 401,406 (2003).
82. Id. (emphases omitted); see also Joan C. Williams, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal
Wall: Using Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMp.
POL'Y J. 287, 288 (2003) (describing how, in a case of maternal wall bias, an employer terminated an
employee based on the belief that she belonged "at home with her child" (quoting Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher,
Inc., 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997)).
83. Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the
Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2245, 2274 (2010); see also id. at 2273-
75 (explaining how, through the proliferation of three kinds of stereotypes faced by women lawyers, law finns
ultimately conclude that hiring women is "not... worth the investment").
84. KLENKE, supra note 56, at 118.
85. See infra Part III for a comprehensive discussion of proliferation of bias and stereotypes found in our
Media Study around themes of gender, motherhood and marriage, competency, and appearance.
86. See FRYE, supra note 29, at 3-4 (describing how the double binds catch "[w]omen ... too, by
networks of forces and barriers that expose one to penalty, loss or contempt whether one works outside the
home or not, is on welfare or not, bears children or not, raises children or not, marries or not, stays married or
not, is heterosexual, lesbian, both or neither").
87. JAMtESON, supra note 29, at 3.
88. Jamieson's binds include: Womb/Brain, Silence/Shame, Sameness/Difference, Femininity/Compe-
tence, and Aging/Invisibility. Id. at 15-16.
89. Id. at 5.
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This kind of framework serves as a useful starting place for thinking about gender
bias in the context of women in the legal profession, but modem gender bias is less
easily categorized. Our Media Study findings demonstrate that bias leveraged against
women based on motherhood, competence, and appearance infrequently exists in
isolation and intersects in various and competing ways, rendering Jamieson's binary
juxtapositions less workable for addressing the concerns she raised nearly two decades
ago, particularly to the extent she suggests that women have moved beyond these
binds. If anything, the media coverage of the most recent nominees to the Supreme
Court shows that the same concerns dominate women's advancement. We believe our
Media Study will facilitate the contextualization of bias against women by recognizing
new complexities as we rethink Frye's and Jamieson's double binds. Two of the binds
Jamieson identified figured prominently in our Media Study, and we address each
briefly below.
i. Rethinking the Womb/Brain Double Bind: The Complexity of
(Non)Motherhood
Stereotypes, bias, and binds based on issues of motherhood proliferate the legal
workplace and impede women's advancement; their impact and consequences have
been extensively addressed. For example, Martha Chamallas explains how far-reaching
motherhood bias extends, even affecting "women who have never been mothers or will
never be mothers."90 Joan Williams is widely known for her characterization of the bias
and discrimination faced by women in the workplace. Specifically, she addresses this
bias in relation to their roles as mothers or potential mothers, something she describes
as the "maternal wall."9 1 She explains that "[1]ong before most women get near the
glass ceiling, they are stopped by the maternal wall: bias against women not because
they are women, but because they are mothers. ' 92 This is significant, according to
Williams, because "[b]ias against mothers stems not only from assumptions about what
mothers are like, but also from assumptions about how mothers should behave. Even
today, women often encounter statements indicating that mothers don't belong in the
workplace." 9
3
90. CHAMALLAS, supra note 76, at 288 (discussing how the category "woman" is linked with
"motherhood," regardless of one's desire to be a mother and how "the importance of the category 'mother' to
feminism and feminist legal theory is unquestioned").
91. A comprehensive discussion of Williams's extensive work on the "maternal wall" and bias against
women in the workplace is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of Williams's work, see
generally Faye J. Crosby et al., The Maternal Wall: Research and Policy Perspectives on Discrimination
Against Mothers, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 675 (2004). For a discussion integrating family responsibility
discrimination case law with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 2007 issuance of enforcement
guidance on caregiver discrimination, see Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FReD":
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1315 (2008).
92. Williams, supra note 81, at 404 (emphasis omitted).
93. Maternal Wall, GENDER BIAS LEARNING PROJECT, http://www.genderbiasleaming.com/stereotype m
aternalwall.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) ("Such statements can either be hostile ('Mothers belong at home')
or benevolent, ('I assumed she didn't want the fellowship because she just had a baby').").
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Professor Jamieson has also documented this phenomenon of bias leveraged
against mothers, describing it as an ongoing womb/brain double bind experienced by
women in the workforce. Originally, it was thought that "one could have either career
or marriage and motherhood, but not both. '94 That bind was eventually replaced by the
idea that indeed "[o]ne could have both career and family, but not at the same time." 95
In her last characterization of this dichotomy, Jamieson describes the bind's
operationalization as the idea that "[t]hey can have both at the same time, but only at
the cost of cheating one or the other. '96 Other scholars have similarly noted the
dilemma. For example, Deborah Rhode notes that "[w]omen with children face
additional double standards and double binds."'97 She observes that women are held to
higher standards of parenting and are judged to be "insufficiently committed, either as
parents or professionals." 98 Stark examples of the binds described by Williams,
Jamieson, Rhode, and others are found in our Media Study. For the female nominees,
motherhood (or nonmotherhood, as in the case of the three most recent female
nominees to the Court) became a repeated focus in media coverage about their
qualifications to the Court, as discussed further in Part III.B. 1.
ii. Rethinking the Femininity/Competence Double Bind: The Complexity
of Appearance as a Measure of Competence
Perceptions of women's competency related to their appearance also figured
prominently in our Media Study, reminding us of another of Jamieson's double binds:
femininity/competence. 99 Under her conception, women are forced to choose between
being perceived as feminine or being perceived as competent, or, in other words,
women must forsake femininity should they want to be deemed competent. 00 As
commentators have observed, "[w]omen often face a form of glass ceiling bias that is a
'Catch 22': either they are penalized for not being competent enough or for being too
competent."'' Equally problematic, women are frequently "assumed to be less
competent than men."' 1 2 As a result, "women often have to 'jump through more hoops'
to prove their ability to do good work due to background expectations that they will
perform worse."' 1 3 Joan Williams characterizes this kind of bias related to the
perception of women's competence in the workforce as "prove it again," which refers
94. JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 54.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Rhode, supra note 60, at 10.
98. Id.
99. For a full discussion of the competency double bind, see JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 120-45.
100. Id.
101. MONA HARRINGTON ET AL., ADVANCING WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION: ACTION PLANS FOR
WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIATIONS 8 (2007).
102. See JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 122-25 (citing social scientific evidence, personal anecdotes,
media examples, and other research to support the claim); Rhode, supra note 60, at 8 ("[F]emale leaders...
often lack the presumption of competence accorded to their male counterparts.").
103. Williams, supra note 81, at 413 (footnote omitted).
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to the "phenomenon... where men are judge[d] on their potential, whereas women are
judged on their accomplishments." l4
The femininity/competence bind is especially acute in the context of appearance
bias. Although appearance bias impacts men and women, the consequences for women
are particularly harsh. Law professor Maureen Howard attributes this to a complexity
that, as a practical matter, plays out differently for women. 10 5 She cites a number of
reasons for this: "the delayed entrance of women into the workforce in general, and
trial work in particular; gender bias and stereotypes; issues surrounding female
sexuality in the workplace; and the differential societal emphasis on and breadth of
gender-specific clothing choices." 0 6 Other scholars, in contrast, recognize the validity
of appearance as a workplace qualification.1
0 7
Our project aims, in part, to shed an empirical light on the "beauty bias" identified
by Professor Rhode'08 and the focus on women's appearance identified by others.
Rhode has written extensively about what she terms "the beauty bias," a concern that is
perhaps most problematic because of "our failure to recognize that it is a significant
problem and one to which law and public policy should respond."'0 9 In comparing
appearance bias "with other inequities that the contemporary women's movement has
targeted" she finds "strikingly little improvement" here.' 10 She challenges her readers
to consider "appearance not only as an aesthetic issue, but as a legal and political one
as well."'''
The negative political implications of appearance bias also must be
acknowledged. Sociologists Susan Ehrlich Martin and Nancy Jurik offer the example of
"a judge allow[ing] the opposing attorney to label a woman attorney's appearance a
'distraction,' [thus] signal[ing] to others that it is acceptable to use a woman's looks as
the basis for objecting against other woman attorneys." 12 Here, the implications for the
individual attorney (and her client) almost pale in comparison to the broader
consequences for women attorneys overall. Studies reveal that women face far more
frequent compliments on their appearance than on the substance of their legal work, in
contrast to male attorneys who receive no appearance-based comments and are
104. Id. at417.
105. Maureen A. Howard, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: One Size Does Not Fit All When it Comes to
Courtroom Attire, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 209, 211 (2010).
106. Id. (footnotes omitted).
107. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2580 (1994) ("Although courts tend to
treat dress and appearance matters as legally insignificant, all the available management literature supports the
view that dress and appearance matter a great deal in the workplace, as they do in other social contexts, and it
is clear that on both an individual level and with respect to women as a whole, dress and appearance have
important, albeit complicated, autonomy and equality implications." (footnote omitted)); Catherine Th~rse
Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 1001 (1991) (noting that common sense
indicates judges and jurors will pay attention to trial participants and their appearance).
108. DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE iN LIFE AND LAW 2
(2010).
109. Id. at2.
110. Id.
11l. Id. at 161.
112. MARTIN & JURIK, supra note 75, at 127.
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complimented almost exclusively on their substantive legal contributions.' 13 As
Professor Rhode notes, this "[o]veremphasis of their appearance deflects attention from
their performance and reinforces sex-based double standards.""
' 14
Significantly, our preliminary findings reveal a greater emphasis on the
appearance of female nominees than their male counterparts, though both female and
male nominees receive a questionable amount of attention. Although one might dismiss
the greater discussion of appearance as trivial (after all, the nominees ultimately do not
receive confirmation based upon an evaluation of their appearance, at least not
explicitly), the media's emphasis on appearance matters. Indeed, Professor Davis
suggests that "the nominee's self presentation [has] become too important in the
process.""15 He points to "Robert Bork's scraggly beard," asking whether the "beard
help[ed] portray him as 'outside the mainstream' of the legal community. 11 6 "These
questions," argues Davis, "should become the subject of increased scholarly research
into the process of nominating Justices in a media age," a call heeded by our Media
Study."I7
2. Gender and the Media
Our project is not primarily concerned about the extent to which the media
actually influences the public's perception of the nomination process, but the media's
well-established role in disseminating information and shaping public perception is
notable." I8 In her work on gender-based medial portrayals, Deborah Rhode has noted
that "[flor any social movement, the media play a crucial role in shaping public
consciousness and public policy."' 19 Similarly, Kathleen Hall Jamieson "suggest[s] that
reporters and editors" not only "reflect[] widely held and hence largely unquestioned
assumptions" in society, but also that "widespread journalistic practices can accelerate
or retard forces at work elsewhere in society."' 120 Speaking specifically to the "sources
of the public's perception of the courts," Professor Bybee adds that "[f]or many
Americans, the media seems to play a critical role.' 121
In their study of television news and the Supreme Court, political scientists Elliot
Slotnick and Jennifer Segal explain that "a long history of empirical research ...
suggests that the media play[s] a very active and influential role in affecting what we
113. ld. at 145.
114. RHODE, supra note 108, at 9.
115. Davis, supra note 38, at 1078.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1079.
118. Feminists in particular find studies of the media revealing. See JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 164-83
(discussing ways that media conveys double-binds on women); Deborah L. Rhode, Media Images, Feminist
Issues, 20 SIGNS 685, 685 (1995) (analyzing how the media portrayed "feminism, feminists, and gender-
related issues" in the latter half of the twentieth century).
119. Rhode, supra note 118, at 685.
120. JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 166.
121. Keith J. Bybee, The Two Faces of Judicial Power, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF THE
COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 3 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007) [hereinafter BENCH PRESS].
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know and what we think is important in politics."'1 22 The media's influence comes with
responsibility, because "those who operate within the media industry have the
discretion to cover some subjects and not others, and because they have control over
how the information is presented to the American public.' 23 Members of the media
have choices in what becomes news and how that news is covered. And "[i]n the
choices that are made, the media have the potential for enormous power over what we
know, understand, and think about our political world."'
2 4
There are two aspects of this discourse on media and gender that relate directly to
our Media Study and warrant brief mention here. One is the gendered nature of the
institution of journalism, specifically the reporting process. A second is the extent to
which media reflects culture and social understanding.
Gendered dimensions of journalism and media exist both in the substantive
content of what is being produced, and the production process itself. The field of print
journalism is one dominated by male executives and reporters. Although "it is difficult
to obtain industry-wide statistics" on the presence of women executives in the media, a
White House Project report indicates that at least fifteen of the nation's leading media
companies do not have a female CEO or board chair and that women are highly
underrepresented on their boards of directors. 125 As for print media on the ground, the
numbers are not any better, with women comprising only thirty-seven percent of full-
time staff positions at daily newspapers,126 ten percent of executive vice-presidents and
general managers at large newspapers, 27 and twenty-nine percent of all executives.
128
The OpEd Project tallies the gender breakdown of opinion bylines in major
newspapers; for the period December 24-31, 2010, in the New York Times, eighteen of
the total opinion pieces were written by women, compared to eighty-two written by
men.129 The Washington Post statistics almost mirrored the Times, with sixteen of the
opinion bylines attributed to women, and eighty-four to men. 130 Our Media Study
122. SLOTNICK & SEGAL, supra note 37, at 6; see also FALK, supra note 34, at 28 (noting that in the
context of presidential elections, "[t]he media not only tell us who our national candidates are, but they are
also instrumental in creating our common conceptions of them"); Virginia Sapiro & Joe Soss, Spectacular
Politics, Dramatic Interpretations: Multiple Meanings in the Thomas/Hill Hearings, 16 POL. COMM. 285, 308
(1999) (conducting study of mass media during the hearings involving then-nominee Clarence Thomas and the
Anita Hill sexual harassment allegations, and concluding that "[p]ublic responses to the Thomas/Hill hearings
drew on a diverse set of overlapping narratives and symbols," which provided multiple influences on viewers
and readers depending upon the source).
123. SLOTNICK & SEGAL, supra note 37, at 6.
124. Id. The way media portrayal influences public perceptions about Supreme Court nominees is
beyond the scope of our Media Study at this time; but is an important line of analysis deserving of future
research.
125. THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT, supra note 26, at 49.
126. U.S. Newsroom Employment Declines, AM. Soc'Y OF NEWS EDITORS (Apr. 16, 2009, 12:57 PM),
http://asne.org/articleview/smid/370/articleid/12/reflab/ll.aspx. This data is from a 2009 "newsroom
employment census" with a response rate of "66.26 percent of all U.S. dail[y]" newspapers. Id.
127. MARY ARNOLD & MARY NESBITT, WOMEN IN MEDIA 2006: FINDING THE LEADER IN You 28
(2006). This data is from a "gender count of managers at 137 newspapers with circulation over 85,000." Id. at
27.
128. Id. at 27-28.
129. THE OPED PROJECT, http://www.theopedproject.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
130. Id.
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similarly found a disproportionate number of articles written by male reporters as
documented by our fifth preliminary finding, discussed below.'31
Media also creates and reflects popular culture. As law professor Stacy Caplow
notes, "[a]n examination of the depiction of law and lawyers in popular media is most
useful as a measurement of the general public perception of the law and the legal
profession."' 132 For example, she explains that "[l]ooking at images of law and lawyers
in popular culture permits us to view a version of the real social impact of legal ideas as
seen through the eyes of a creative interpreter and as processed by a lay audience."'
133
Furthermore, she suggests that "[e]xamining images of women lawyers thus permits us
to question the status that women seem to have attained in the legal profession, and the
personal, moral, or emotional adjustments they have been required to make in order to
participate in that world, as conceived on film."' 134 From these images "[w]e can also
ask how the public is likely to perceive women lawyers as a result of these images."'
135
This is equally true of journalism as it is of film, literature, and the arts. 136
Consequently, mainstream news reporting "bears some responsibility for creating the
public's understanding of the law since many people derive all of their information
about the meaning of legal events through the lens of popular media."' 137 Other scholars
like Kathleen Hall Jamieson go even a step further: "The press, in other words,
perpetuates the binds that tie."'
138
Because news media purports to convey facts rather than fiction, we submit that
the news industry bears unique responsibilities. Other scholars agree. For example,
Rhode suggests that media play a role in counteracting the beauty bias identified in her
own research. She recommends that the media portray "more diverse and healthy
cultural ideals" and cover more "appearance discrimination" along with "more
responsible treatment of weight-related issues."' 139 Similarly, one goal of our Media
131. See infra Part I1I.A for a discussion of the results of our Media Study.
132. Stacy Caplow, Still in the Dark: Disappointing Images of Women Lawyers in the Movies, 20
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 55, 58 (1999).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also Anna M. Archer, From Legally Blonde to Miss Congeniality: The Femininity
Conundrum, 13 CARDOzo J.L. & GENDER 1, 21 (2006) (concluding that "[t]he popular media plays a role in
the development" of gender-based role expectations by reinforcing "the stereotypical viewpoints already intact
in society").
136. For further discussion on the portrayal of women lawyers in other areas of media, such as television
and film, see Archer, supra note 135, at I (suggesting that "popular movies ... illustrate how the influence of.
.gender stereotypes... serves as a blockade along the route to gender equality"); Diane Klein, Ally McBeal
and Her Sisters: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Representations of Women Lawyers on Prime-
Time Television, 18 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 259, 260 (1998) (finding "that substantial biases, in the form of
representational inaccuracies, persist in prime-time television's depiction of women lawyers"). See also
Victoria Alexeeva, Comment, Images of Women Lawyers: Over-Representation of Their Femininity in Media,
4 CARDozo WOMEN'S L.J. 361, 376 (2003) (arguing that popular television shows like "Ally McBeal"
"portray[] women lawyers through a male standard for women").
137. Caplow, supra note 132, at 58.
138. JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 165.
139. RHODE, supra note 108, at 151.
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Study is to suggest that consideration be given to a more balanced portrayal of women
lawyers.
3. Gender and Judging
Our Media Study operates from the premise that we need more women in the
judiciary. 40 In making such an assertion, however, we neither assume that all female
judges adjudicate from a feminist standpoint, nor base our research upon this premise.
Legal scholar Theresa M. Beiner identifies numerous categories around which scholars
typically gravitate in justifying their support of diversity in the federal judiciary.' 41
Beiner articulates: "In the end, there are many good reasons to diversify the federal
bench. Whether the argument be based on issues of fairness, legitimacy, providing role
models, or incorporating a variety of American experiences and perspectives into
judicial decision making, the case for a diverse judiciary is strong."'' 42
The scholarship surrounding the influence of female judges has largely
"considered how judges vote differently from or similar to their male colleagues or
whether they have pursued a common women's judicial identity."'1 43 The literature is
mixed; scholars argue both for and against the proposition that gender makes a
difference. 144 We are not concerned at this juncture, however, with the ideological
perspectives of Supreme Court nominees, other than to consider how the media might
portray such perspectives. That said, a rich literature exists exploring the impact of
gender on judging.145 Although a comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the
140. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of varying viewpoints addressing the
idea that more women are needed in the judiciary.
141. Theresa M. Beiner, White Male Heterosexist Norms in the Confirmation Process, WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 15-18), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1706164 (identifying
categories of opinion on why diversity on the bench matters, like symbolic or functional representation,
substantive representation, and providing role models for those individuals who have not previously been
represented on the bench).
142. Id. at 20.
143. Karen O'Connor & Alixandra B. Yanus, Judging Alone: Reflections on the Importance of Women
on the Court, 6 POL. & GENDER 441,446 (2010).
144. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins et al., Gender, Critical Mass, and Judicial Decision Making, 32 L. &
POL'Y 260, 261, 263 (2010) (reflecting that "[c]onsidered collectively, the result of research subjecting gender
effects to empirical scrutiny in the judicial arena has been decidedly mixed," leading to a failure to "uncover
systematic differences between male and female jurists"); Kenney, supra note 36, at 436 (noting that political
scientists have found that gender does not effect judicial decision making, with the occasional exception of
some sex discrimination and divorce cases); Deborah Rhode, In a "Different" Voice: What Does the Research
About How Gender Influences Judging Actually Say?, SLATE (June 10, 2009, 4:20 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2220220 (discussing the "cottage industry of empirical work [that] has tried to
disentangle the influence of gender on judging" and observing that the "[r]esults vary" on whether gender
makes a difference).
145. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 31, at 304 & n.37 (providing a list of scholars who suggest that
"Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg have adopted a distinctively 'feminine' jurisprudential approach simply by
reason of being female"); Anita F. Hill, What Difference Will Women Judges Make? Looking Once More at
the "Woman Question", in WOMEN AND LEADERSHP, supra note 30, at 185-86 (concluding that female judges
"make a difference" on the bench because the contribution of their alternative perspective "reaffirms the
promise of equality under the law" and may "influence... the overall direction the law takes").
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scope of this Article, we highlight certain aspects as part of the backdrop for
understanding the outcomes of our Media Study.
A notable study conducted by law scholars Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya
Holman, and Eric A. Posner tested the hypothesis that female judges are worse (or, as
Sotomayor claimed, better) than men. 146 Distinguishing their research from the prior
literature that asks whether "female judges are likely to bring a distinctive perspective
to bear [on their cases]," their study instead focuses on "the relationship between the
gender of judges and judicial quality," and tests "whether gender has a significant
effect on judicial performance."' 147 After examining all the state high court judges from
1998 to 2000 using three measures of 'judicial output".-"opinion production, outside
state citations, and co-partisan disagreements"-the study failed to find significant
evidence that gender effects the quality of judicial performance, 148 though it should be
noted that some dispute their results.' 49
Other empirical work, however, has found a "link between a judge's gender and
the likelihood of her voting for the plaintiff in sex discrimination and sexual
harassment cases under Title VII.' 5° For example, Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, and
Andrew D. Martin are the authors of a highly regarded study, Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on Judging.'51 Their work explores "the role of sex in judging by
addressing two questions of long-standing interest to political scientists: whether and in
what ways male and female judges decide cases distinctly-'individual effects'-and
whether and in what ways serving with a female judge causes males to behave
differently-'panel effects."' 15 2 Their study, based on an evaluation of the impact of
gender in an unprecedented thirteen areas of law, found that "the presence of women in
the federal appellate judiciary rarely has an appreciable empirical effect on judicial
outcomes. Rarely, though, is not never."'153 Finally, there is a proliferation of research
and empirical studies that consider the impact of gender on judicial decision making in
the context of specific issues, such as sexual orientation, child custody, and criminal
sentencing. 154
146. Stephen J. Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504, 504 (2011).
147. Id. at 505.
148. Id at 504. But see Royce de R. Barondes, Federal District Judge Gender and Reversals 19 (July IS,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1640876
(arguing that the results in Choi et al., supra note 146, are "not informative" because the authors do not
consider that a relationship may already exist between gender and their selected measures of judicial
performance, and therefore choosing a different methodology).
149. See Barondes, supra note 148, at 19.
150. Dixon, supra note 31, at 312. For a summary of empirical work documenting a correlation between
the gender of a judge and the outcome in sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases, see id at 311-12.
151. Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. Sci. 389
(2010).
152. Id at 389.
153. Id at 406.
154. See, e.g., Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, State High Courts and Divorce: The Impact of Judicial
Gender, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 940-41 (2005) (concluding that female state supreme court justices are more
likely than their male colleagues to vote in "support of the female litigant's position in cases of divorce, child
custody, child support, spousal maintenance, and property settlement"); Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert,
Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge's Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77
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B. The Unexplored Intersection of Gender, Media, and the Supreme Court
Research on gender, media, and government largely surrounds the electorate and
rarely includes the courts. For example, political science studies often focus on the role
of gender in state campaigns (gubernatorial and legislative candidates) and federal
presidential and congressional races. 155 In a similar vein, Professor Erika Falk, a noted
communications scholar, has published a comprehensive study documenting the
gender-based media bias in the campaigns of women for president.
156
The judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, remains a relatively untouched
site for exploration, empirical or otherwise, of gender and media related issues, an
omission that scholars in the field acknowledge. As Professor Sally Kenney comments
on this absence, "[t]he flurry of attention over such rare events as the nomination of a
woman to the U.S. Supreme Court or a conference on the 200th anniversary of women
and the constitution (1988 in Atlanta) punctuates the silence of the routine absence of a
gender analysis of our third branch of government."' 157 That the courts are relatively
unexplored in this context, however, does not mean that they are not deserving of
attention. Professor Kenney suggests that "[t]reating the study of law and courts as a
subfield of American politics makes even less sense than ever."' 58 And Professor Linda
Greenhouse notes, going a step further, "press coverage of the courts is a subject at
least as worthy of public concern and scholarly attention as press coverage of politics,
perhaps even more so.''15
9
Among those scholars who analyze the Supreme Court nomination process,
160
few focus on the media's portrayal of the Justices themselves as compared to the
decisions rendered by the Court.' 6 1 As political scientist and media studies scholar
Soc. FORCES 1163, 1186 (1999) (concluding that female judges are "somewhat more likely to incarcerate
defendants and impose somewhat longer prison sentences than [male] judges"); Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Note,
Gendered Justice: Do Male and Female Judges Rule Differently on Questions of Gay Rights?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 2087, 2123 (2005) (concluding that female judges are more likely than male judges to rule that a law
violates gay rights). For an innovative analysis of scholars who look at gender differences in judging, see Sally
J. Kenney, Thinking About Gender and Judging, 15 INT'LJ. LEGAL PROF. 87, 105-07 (2008).
155. E.g., LAWLESS & Fox, supra note 55, at 16-36 (examining the effect of gender bias on the
emergence of viable female candidates and the difference between male and female decisions to run for
office). Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox, in attempting to answer the question of why women choose not to
run for office, empirically investigated the intersections of gender and candidate ambition and found that "[alt
the individual level . . .gender expectations and stereotypes persist and can affect the evaluations and
experiences of women candidates and officeholders." Id. at 24.
156. See generally FALK, supra note 34.
157. Kenney, supra note 36, at 434.
158. Id. at 435.
159. Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 105
YALE L.J. 1537, 1538 (1996). Professor Greenhouse's article explores obstacles, created and perpetuated by
the powerful institutions ofjouralism and the Supreme Court, that inhibit important public understanding of
the Court. Id. at 1539.
160. For two examples of interesting work on Supreme Court nominees that omit discussion of the
media's role in the nomination process, see James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Confirmation Politics
and the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Institutional Loyalty, Positivity Bias, and the Alito Nomination,
53 AM. J. POL. SC. 139 (2009); Mark Silverstein & William Haltom, You Can't Always Get What You Want:
Reflections on the Ginsburg and Breyer Nominations, 12 J.L. & POL. 459 (1996).
161. SLOTNICK & SEGAL, supra note 37, at 2.
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Richard Davis, author of "one of the few scholarly studies on this subject" 162 notes,
"[tihe Supreme Court usually has been excluded from a discussion of political
institutions and their relationship with the press," with the exception of a "small
number of empirical studies . . . .[that] focus[] on the amount and nature of news
coverage of the Court [and its decisions]" and essentially criticize the quantity of
coverage that occurs. 163 Although some scholars have begun to examine media
coverage of Supreme Court nominees, to our knowledge none employ empirical
analysis to assess the role of gender in the quantity and quality of media coverage
received by Supreme Court nominees. For example, communication science scholars
have used studies of media coverage during the nomination periods to analyze
differences between press and blog coverage in the context of new mediated
deliberation164 or the relationship between politics, media, and blogs.165 Similarly, legal
and political science scholar Keith Bybee recently published an essay on the media's
depiction of Kagan's nomination.
166
Some scholars focus specifically on the nomination/confirmation process,
including law professors Lori Ringhand and Paul Collins, who conducted an empirical
study of Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for nominees to the Court from 1939 to
2009.167 They found evidence "that female and minority nominees are differently
treated than more traditional white male nominees." 168 As just one example, they noted
that "senators pressed female and minority nominees substantially more often on issues
of judicial philosophy and banking and finance. ' 169 They also discovered that "senators
engaged in far less comments involving hearing administration and chatter for female
and minority nominees, indicating that senators interrogated female and minority
nominees on more substantive issues than white male nominees."'1 70 They assert that
their study will assist "scholars interested in exploring causal mechanisms explaining
162. Greenhouse, supra note 159, at 1559.
163. RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS, at xi (1994) ("All
[studies about the media's depiction of the Court] have concluded that news coverage of the Court is
superficial and spotty."). For a different perspective on this issue, see Greenhouse, supra note 159, at 1559
("in the view of ... political scientist Richard Davis, the press is a public relations tool for the Court
specifically for the task of reinforcing deference toward its decisions. That is not the Court and not the press
corps I have observed for these last eighteen years. Rather, I see a Court that is quite blithely oblivious to the
needs of those who convey its work to the outside world, and a press corps that is often groping along in the
dark, trying to make sense out of the shadows on the cave wall." (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). See also Michael Comiskey, Not Guilty: The News Media in the Supreme Court Confirmation
Process, 15 J.L. & POL. 1, 1 (1999) (concluding that "media coverage of recent confirmations has benefited
both the public and the nominees").
164. E.g., Michael Xenos, New Mediated Deliberation: Blog and Press Coverage of the Alito
Nomination, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 485 (2008).
165. E.g., Taylor Ansley & Patrick Sellers, Press Independence and Blogs in the Alito Nomination
Debate, 36 CONGREsS & THE PRESIDENCY 297 (2009).
166. Bybee, supra note 24.
167. Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M. Collins, Jr., May it Please the Senate: An Empirical Analysis of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings of Supreme Court Nominees, 1939-2009, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 589
(2011).
168. Id. at 633.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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the connection between public opinion and the evolution of constitutional law" because
the data "provide useful information regarding how senators and nominees use the
conformation process to validate, refute, or debate constitutional change over time.'
' 71
Our project, in contrast, sits at the unique intersection of law, gender, political
science, and mass media. We recognize that some may find our merger of these fields
controversial, especially because we are using this convergence to analyze the place of
women lawyers in the profession.7 2 Professor Ann Bartow notes that "[w]riting about
women lawyers is a somewhat nerve wracking proposition" because feminist academic
writers can be particularly hard on each other.173 She also observes that "[f]eminism
does not have a universally recognized governing body, and 'feminism' is not a brand
or trademark with a fixed social or commercial meaning. Investigations into what
feminism is, or should be, have fueled debates and created rich bodies of varied
scholarship."' 1
74
We acknowledge that there are some feminist scholars who may take issue with
our approach. For example, legal scholar Rosalind Dixon is critical of various empirical
studies on gender and judging that suggest a correlation between an increase in female
judges and an increase in results that will support feminist values. 75 She contends that
merely adding more women will not necessarily result in more judges who are
"sympathetic to pro-feminist views."' 76 There are some compelling reasons to agree
with Dixon's thesis. We concur, for example, with Dixon's observation that men can
advance a feminist agenda, and that, conversely, women might compromise that same
agenda. 177 A study by political science scholars Maya Sen and Adam Glynn is telling
on this point, revealing that one's life experience (i.e., raising a daughter) is more likely
171. Id. The authors cite scholars "working in th[e] growing area [of positive constitutional scholarship],
such as Larry Kramer, Barry Friedman and Neil Siegal, [who] are striving to create a realistic, empirically
grounded understanding of the dynamic relationship between public opinion and constitutional development."
Id. at 591.
172. We also realize that questions occasionally arise about the use of empirical research in legal
scholarship. E.g., Brian Leiter, On So-Called "Empirical Legal Studies" and Its Problems, BRIAN LEITER'S
LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (July 6, 2010), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-empirical
-legal-studies.html. As explained more fully in the body of the Article, we designed a rigorous content analysis
to explore and quantify in a scholarly and scientific way our anecdotal observations about the media's
coverage of Supreme Court nominees. See infra Part II.C for discussion of the content analysis.
173. Bartow, supra note 70, at 264.
174. Id. at 233 & n.55 (citing the work of Anita Bemstein, Mary Anne Case, Martha Chamallas, Andrea
Dworkin, Martha Ertman, Martha Fineman, Katharine Franke, Catherine MacKinnon, Martha Minow, Martha
Nussbaum, and Joan Williams).
175. Dixon, supra note 31,at 311-19.
176. Id. at 338 (suggesting that the focus on gender parity is misguided, arguing instead for the addition
of judges who have a feminist ideology). Dixon acknowledges feminists' desire for equal numbers of women
in the judiciary but concludes that "feminists must also weigh these benefits associated with the mere presence
of a female justice on the Court against the importance of a justice's substantive approach to issues of central
concern to feminists, such as abortion, pay equity, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and an ongoing
dialogue about the meaning of gender equality under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 336.
177. See id at 338 (noting that a President might "exploit [feminists' focus on gender parity] in order to
appoint an actively anti-feminist female judge" and that, in such an instance, feminists "should choose the
feminist who is male").
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to cultivate feminist values than one's gender. 178 Other research suggests that party
affiliation is the best predictor. 179 We do not equate being a woman with being a
feminist and our project makes no distinctions between feminist and nonfeminist
identities of lawyers or judges, nor do we equate female Justices with feminist
viewpoints.
It is important, nevertheless, for women generally to be well represented in
positions of power in the legal profession, regardless of their political ideology.
Ginsburg not long ago expressed a similar sentiment in her remarks at Southwestern
University School of Law, where she observed, "[a] system of justice is the richer for
the diversity of background and experience of its participants. It is the poorer, in terms
of evaluating what is at stake and the impact of its judgments, if its members-its
lawyers, jurors, and judges-are all cast from the same mold."1 80 Only when women
have reached a place of more equal representation does it make sense to begin to argue
for distinctions like those suggested by Dixon. We are deeply troubled by the media's
portrayal of women who have attained powerful legal positions. Although we would
not go so far as Professor Monopoli to legislate gender parity on the Supreme Court,18'
we do believe it is imperative to women's advancement in the profession's power
pipeline that we all engage in a critical examination of the media portrayal of women
lawyers, especially those women lawyers who have attained significant positions of
power. To this end, we investigated gendered portrayals of Supreme Court nominees,
and asked how this knowledge might motivate the resolution of gender disparity in the
legal profession's pipeline to power. We believe that the findings from our Media
Study will prove similarly useful for those engaged in the exploration of public opinion
and the Court, and also for those examining connections between public opinion and
the advancement of women in the legal profession's power pipeline. Rhode and others
are exactly right in their assessment that the pipeline "leaks" for various reasons,
whether women choose motherhood or other paths. 182 We are troubled by more than
leaks, however.
Equally problematic is the treatment of women who remain in the power pipeline;
the proliferation of stereotypes and bias inherent in news media coverage may impact
the professional experiences of these women themselves, and may systemically affect
the way others perceive women who pursue positions of power.'8 3 We are reminded of
178. See Adam Glynn & Maya Sen, Like Daughter, Like Judge: How Having Daughters Affect Judges'
Voting on Women's Issues I (Mar. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu
/msen/files/judicialdaughters.pdf ("Looking at data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals, we find that ....
conditional on the number of children, judges with daughters consistently vote in a more liberal fashion on
gender issues than judges without daughters.").
179. See Deborah Rhode & Barbara Kellerman, Introduction, to WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP, supra note
30 at 18 ("Extensive research on U.S. legislatures finds that party affiliation is more important than gender in
predicting votes on women's issues, and that ideology is more important in predicting sponsorship of
legislation on these issues." (citations omitted)).
180. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Supreme Court: A Place for Women, 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 189, 190 (2003).
181. See Monopoli, supra note 31, at 45.
182. Rhode, supra note 60, at 7; see also Monroe & Chiu, supra note 59, at 306.
183. "[A] rigid adherence to gender demarcation can be inaccurate and counterproductive, helping
women advance into leadership positions in one instance . .. but hurting them in others ...." Todd L.
Pittinsky et al., The Great Women Theory of Leadership? Perils of Positive Stereotypes and Precarious
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Marilyn Frye's infamous birdcage metaphor in which she describes the difficulty
inherent in recognizing oppression when employing a "myopic" focus.' 84 When one
takes a step back and examines the cage (or oppressive structure) holistically, however,
"[i]t is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically
related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which,
by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon."' 185
Our Media Study reveals, on a macroscopic level, the proliferation of bias and
stereotypes against women lawyers.
For some women, the stereotyping and bias might convince them to exit the
power pipeline or dissuade them from entering it in the first place. For example, during
the appointment process that ultimately led to Alito's nomination, at least two women
(likely federal circuit judges Edith Hollan Jones and Edith Brown Clement)
"withdr[ew] their names from consideration owing to concerns about the confirmation
environment."'1 86 Such concerns may very well include the media circus that
accompanies the confirmation process. Indeed, "[t]he most profound (and
uncomfortable) questions at the moment may not be so much about the obstacles to
women's leadership as about the appeal of leadership to women."' 187 Further, gender
stereotypes and bias perpetuate ideas more broadly about what a female leader "looks
like"; this played out in the media coverage of the Sotomayor and Kagan nominations
as discussed more fully below in Part IlI.
In contrast to traditional scholarship devoted to women, leadership, and power in
the profession, which focuses upon identifying pathways to power, 188 we aim to
redefine the language used in assessing and accessing the power pipeline. Political
scientist Ruth B. Mandel has observed that the "fit" for women in leadership may be
uncomfortable because they must "travel in domains designed by and for men, replete
with the residues of men's leadership for centuries."' 189 She suggests that one way to
make the fit more comfortable is for "women ... [to] redesign the . . .language of
Pedestals, in WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP, supra note 30, at 98 ("By characterizing and stereotyping leadership
traits as gendered, we ultimately exclude, misrepresent, mold, and polarize the sexes, and leadership in
general.").
184. FRYE, supra note 29, at 4-5.
185. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
186. CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH GEORGE W. BUSH 4-5 (2007).
187. Ruth B. Mandel, A Question About Women and the Leadership Option, in THE DIFFERENCE
"DIFFERENCE" MAKES, supra note 60, at 73.
188. For example, scholarship in this area has focused on women obtaining positions of power by
following certain paths, such as acquiring power through their husbands or other men, or following a ladder
from lower to higher courts. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 60, at 3 ("For most of recorded history, women were
largely excluded from formal leadership positions .... Few ... women . . .acquired leadership positions in
their own right. Most exercised influence through relationships with men."); Carroll, supra note 13, at 440
(observing that the first women governors obtained their positions by replacing their deceased or impeached
husbands); Martin et al., supra note 25 ("Research on the career backgrounds of women state supreme court
justices and women federal court judges strongly suggests that women lawyers follow a judicial ladder from
state courts to federal district courts to federal appellate courts." (citations omitted)). A similar "pipeline to
power" has been identified for women who rise to higher-level political offices such as governor or member of
Congress. Carroll, supra note 13, at 446.
189. Mandel, supra note 187, at 73.
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leadership to make it friendly to both sexes." 190 Examining the language media
employs to characterize nominees to the most powerful legal position in the nation is
our response to Mandel's call.
C. Supreme Court Nominee Media Study Rationale
Though this research project emerged from our informal and unscientific selection
and clipping of articles during the nomination period and confirmation hearings for
Sotomayor and Kagan, we turned to a more empirical process to evaluate and measure
these initial observations and questions regarding the intersections of media, gender,
and Supreme Court nominees. After careful consideration, we ultimately decided to
conduct a content analysis, employing a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative
analysis, as the research method for our Media Study.
1. Content Analysis as Research Method
Although political scientists and legal and communication scholars have not
specifically tackled the issues we address in this project, they rely on various empirical
research methods, like content analysis, to gain an understanding of the complexities
and intersections of gender 191 and media. 192 Content analysis, which involves the
systematic examination and study of texts and other preexisting cultural material, 193 is
widely considered a mixed-method form of research that does not automatically signal
either quantitative or qualitative methods and often includes the possibility of both.
194
According to Martin Bauer, social psychologist with the Methodology Institute at the
London School of Economics, content analysis is considered a "hybrid technique,"
meant to bridge the "quantity/quality divide in social research."'195 Unlike other forms
of research, content analysis is unobtrusive and involves analyzing forms, in our case
news articles, that are by nature constant, preexisting, and noninteractive.
196
190. Id.
191. KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK 202 (2002) (explaining how
research examining gender roles across all sectors of media abounds; as a popular area of study, it crosses
disciplinary lines and includes analysis of both text and images like literature, news, the Internet, magazines,
film, television, children's books, music, stamps, music videos, and election coverage).
192. See generally GENDER AND ELECTIONS: SHAPING THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (Susan J.
Carroll & Richard L. Fox eds., 2010); KAHN, supra note 34; WOMEN AND ELECTIVE OFFICE: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE (Sue Thomas & Clyde Wilcox eds., 1998); WOMEN, MEDIA, AND POLITICS, supra note 34.
193. NEUENDORF, supra note 191, at 202; DANIEL RIFFE ET AL., ANALYZING MEDIA MESSAGES: USING
QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS IN RESEARCH 18-20 (2005); Martin W. Bauer, Classical Content Analysis:
A Review, in QUALITATIVE RESEARCHING WITH TEXT, IMAGE, AND SOUND: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK 131, 133
(Martin W. Bauer & George Gaskell eds., 2000); Patricia Lina Leavy, The Feminist Practice of Content
Analysis, in FEMINIST RESEARCH PRACTICE 223, 227 (Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber & Patricia Lina Leavy eds.,
2007).
194. See Bauer, supra note 193, at 132; Leavy, supra note 193, at 227-28. Originally, content analysis
was predominately quantitative, in that it primarily involved counting words or phrases in a particular text.
Today, researchers view it as more of a hybrid form of research practice, one which involves both quantitative
and qualitative characteristics.
195. Bauer, supra note 193, at 132.
196. Leavy, supra note 193, at 227.
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Content analysis as a research tool allows researchers to look at and explore
culture through the lens of the media. If culture is a place or site where ideas are
created, disseminated, and consumed, then it can be useful to try to unravel or
deconstruct the writings that are interconnected with how men and women are viewed.
But media is not just a medium that captures the message; the explanation, indeed, is
more complex. Sociology professor Patricia Leavy explains, "cultural artifacts do not
simply reflect social norms and values; texts are central to how norms and values come
to be shaped."'197 In our Media Study, we evaluate media articles as our texts or
products of culture, observing and recording a series of variables designed to illustrate
how nominees to the Supreme Court are portrayed. We find this analysis compelling
because, as Shulamit Reinharz, sociology professor and director of the Women's
Research Center at Brandeis University, and Rachel Kulick explain, "[t]he cultural
products of any given society at any given time reverberate with the themes of that
society and that era."'
198
2. Why This Content Analysis?
Ten years ago, our specific Media Study would not have been possible because
this is the first time in history that we have had a significant sample of women
nominated to the Court. Even after O'Connor's nomination in 1981, twelve years
passed and five new male Justices'99 were nominated before another woman 20 0 was
selected to serve on the Court. In light of the timeliness, we chose the specific focus of
our study-the media's depiction of Supreme Court nominees-for three reasons. First,
the Supreme Court serves not as only a significant marker of power within our three
branches of government but it is perhaps also seen as one of, if not the most, powerful
institution within the legal profession. Unlike other powerful legal institutions, like law
firms and corporations, the Court is subject to extensive media coverage in the public
sphere. As such, it is uniquely situated to provide an opportunity for analysis and
discussion. Second, because the Court occupies such a powerful position in the legal
profession, there has been a great deal of anecdotal discussion20 1 about the media's
coverage of nominees. At least in the context of our research interests, there has been
some informal analysis 20 2 but no major empirical study. Finally, largely as a practical
matter, mainstream media articles covering the nominees to the Court are widely
197. Id. at 229.
198. Shulamit Reinharz & Rachel Kulick, Reading Between the Lines: Feminist Content Analysis into
the Second Millennium, in HANDBOOK OF FEMINIST RESEARCH: THEORY AND PRAxis 257, 258 (Sharlene Nagy
Hesse-Biber ed., 2007).
199. Antonin Scalia, Robert Bork, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas were all
nominated to the Court in the years following Sandra Day O'Connor's appointment. Supreme Court
Nominations, supra note 22.
200. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was nominated by President Clinton on June 14, 1993 and was confirmed on
August 3, 1993. Id.
201. See supra note 21 and accompanying text discussing other sources that discuss media coverage of
nominees.
202. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of some studies on media coverage
of nominees.
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viewed by the public. Capturing four decades of media coverage required some
creativity and careful strategy as described more fully below.
3. Why Focus on Nominees to the Supreme Court?
We chose to focus on the media coverage of Supreme Court nominees, rather than
the coverage of sitting Justices, because of the extensive and unusually invasive level
of reporting that occurs during the nomination and confirmation process. As
background, the Constitution provides that Supreme Court appointees are nominated by
the President and confirmed with the "[a]dvice and [c]onsent" of the Senate, or, in
other words, a majority vote by the Senate approving the appointment.20 3 Although
confirmation hearings are not required, the Senate has taken testimony by the nominees
and others since 1925.204 The process can be a matter of weeks or may extend several
months, depending on the controversy surrounding the appointment. 2 5 To determine
our list of nominees, we selected only those individuals whose names were officially
submitted to the Senate, and included them in the study whether confirmed or not. Our
total pool was sixteen nominees.
20 6
The media's coverage of a Supreme Court nominee is significant, in part, because,
as Nina Totenberg explains, "[t]he only time a Supreme Court nominee is accountable
at all to the public is before he or she is confirmed. ' ' 20 7 Thus, the media serves an
important role for educating both the public and the Senate because
[t]he public deserves to find out beforehand about the men and women who,
if confirmed, will be the final arbiters of the rules by which the country is
governed. And the Senate is entitled to take the public's views into account
when deciding whether to consent to the nomination.
20 8
The media also bears significant responsibility in determining what the public learns
about the nomination. Not only do "[t]hose who cover the Court ... have views and
find themselves more sympathetic to some results and to some Justices than to others,"
says Linda Greenhouse, but they also decide what is important and what will be
reported. 20 9 The nomination period also is significant in terms of media coverage
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
204. History of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/history/index.cfin (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
205. For example, Justice Stevens was nominated by President Ford on November 28, 1975 and
confirmed by the Senate (a vote of 98-0) on December 17, 1975. In contrast, Justice Thomas was nominated
by President H. W. Bush on July 8, 1991 but not confirmed by the Senate (a vote of 52-48) until October 15,
1991. Supreme Court Nominations, supra note 22.
206. See infra Table I for a list of nominees in the study. We counted John Roberts's nomination only
once-the first time he was nominated and introduced to the public. The subsequent withdrawal of his
nomination and re-announcement as a candidate for the position of Chief Justice occurred outside of the
introductory week timeframe, and we opted not to include his second nomination in our analysis.
207. Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1213, 1229(1988).
208. Id.
209. Greenhouse, supra note 159, at 1548-49 ("Of course, deciding what is important among the
thousands of individual Court actions, which will be reported, and what pattern will be discerned from them
can never be value-free. Those who make these judgments are the products of what they care about and also
what they know.").
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because "one of the most significant public discussions of the Court happens when a
vacancy on the high bench is being filled." 210 Thus, the media's portrayal of the
nominee is as much about the nominee as a person as it is about the Court as an
institution.
4. The Nominations of Justices Powell and Rehnquist: A Starting Place for
Analysis
Our Media Study begins with the nominations of Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
Both Justices were nominated and confirmed in late 1971 and sworn in during the first
weeks of 1972. We selected this starting point mindful of the feminist movement's
influence at the time.
The early 1970s were a powerful time in history,211 evidenced not just by a
proliferation of gender-based Supreme Court cases including Roe v. Wade,2 12 but also
by the passage of legislation like the Equal Rights Amendment 213 and Title IX.214 In
somewhat quick succession, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases that directly
impacted women's lives.215 Each important in its own right, taken together these
legislative and judicial events were particularly significant. The events serve as
important markers of progress in the women's movement. 216 These markers also
coincide with the Powell and Rehnquist nominations, which, interestingly, carry their
own tangential gendered significance. (During the vetting process of possible
nominees, President Nixon considered a woman, Mildred Lillie, to fill one of these
210. Bybee, supra note 24, at 40 (citing Agiesta, supra note 25 (reporting that polls conducted during the
Kagan confirmation showed about forty percent of those surveyed were paying close attention to the process)).
211. See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN: CASES IN LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 334 (1988) ("The years 1971 to 1973 witnessed an explosion of women's rights
developments at the Supreme Court level.").
212. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
213. S.J. Res. 41, 111 th Cong. (2010). In 1972, the ERA was passed by the Senate, 84-8 and the House
354-24. Although the ERA has never been ratified by the states (only 35 of the requisite 38), it has been
reintroduced every year in Congress since 1982. Leah Donaldson, Female Legislators in the United States and
Rhode Island, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 278, 291 (2011). Nonetheless, the creation of constitutional
language surrounding gender equality is significant.
214. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235, 373 (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)). Title IX was renamed in 2002 the Patsy T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education
Act, in honor of its primary author, Congresswoman Mink. Act of Oct. 29, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-255, 116
Stat. 734.
215. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79, 690-91 (1973) (holding that a statute violated
the Due Process Clause when, for administrative convenience only, it prevented spouses of female service
members from being claimed as dependents unless they were in fact dependent on the service member for over
one-half of their support, thereby preventing them from receiving benefits that were available to spouses of
male service members); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that a statute prohibiting
contraception violated the Equal Protection Clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72-73, 76-77 (1971) (holding
that a statute violated the Equal Protection Clause when it preferred males over females in instances where an
equally qualified male and female petitioned to administer the same estate).
216. See MARTIN & JURIK, supra note 75, at 5-6 (discussing legislative and judicial victories for
women's rights and noting that "[feminist goals, such as women's rights to paid employment, equal pay for
equal work, and jobs in all occupations without limitations imposed by sex discrimination, became more
socially acceptable").
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vacancies. 217) Although a project reaching all the way back in time to the Court's
origins might provide a more wholly comprehensive picture, 218 given budget and time
constraints, together with the gendered lens through which this project was
conceptualized, we selected the Powell and Rehnquist nominations as an appropriate
place to begin the Media Study.
D. Research Methodology
To conduct the first phase of the Media Study, we created a unique collection of
articles drawn from the New York Times and the Washington Post. In deciding to focus
on these sources, we followed a selection process similar to that used by other experts
in the field. We strove for both ideological balance as well as expertise in reporting on
the Court. 2 1 9 We gathered every news article, opinion piece, and letter to the editor
published in the Times and Post, from the date the President announced 220 the
217. Lillie's name was removed as a possibility after the American Bar Association refused to extend its
support to her candidacy, as discussed in greater detail below. It is worth noting that Lillie was not the first
woman to appear on a president's shortlist for nominations. The first woman was Soia Mentschikoff, though
ultimately President Lyndon B. Johnson named Abe Fortas. NEMACHECK, supra note 186, app. at 150-55.
Until the nomination for the vacancy filled by Justice Sotomayor, only sixteen women had appeared on the
shortlist for Supreme Court nominations. Id.
218. In a subsequent phase of this project we may extend our Media Study back at least to the
nomination of Thurgood Marshall, the nation's first African-American Supreme Court Justice. We believe that
the analysis of the media's coverage of race in the context of Supreme Court nominations will yield important
and significant findings, both in the context of our study on gender and as an independent analysis.
219. See Mark Obbie, Winners and Losers, in BENCH PRESS, supra note 121, at 161 ("[The New York
Times and the Washington Post] are generally perceived as the two most important newspapers covering the
Supreme Court and the Court nominations. With their extraordinarily deep reporting resources, in numbers of
journalists and expertise, they help set the agenda for the debate."); cf DAVIS, supra note 163, at 162 (selecting
wire copy of the Associated Press for conducting a content analysis of Supreme Court decisions because it is
the "most widely utilized source of information about the U.S. Supreme Court," though acknowledging that
"[l]arge metropolitan dailies-such as the New York Times [and] Washington Post" have "their own reporter at
the Court for whom the Court is a major assignment of their beat"). Additionally, the New York Times and the
Washington Post have served as invaluable data for similar studies of media impact on the judiciary. See
JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 169 ("analyz[ing] all the print coverage found in the New York Times, Washington
Post, and major state newspapers covering the federal elections featuring women in 1990, 1992, and 1993");
Ansley & Sellers, supra note 165, at 302 (analyzing all stories appearing during the Alito nomination period
from the Washington Post and the Washington Times "due to their ideological counter-balance and extensive
coverage of the Alito nomination"); Bybee, supra note 24, at 146-47 (using the New York Times, Washington
Post, and Los Angeles Times "to identify the images of judging projected by the entire confirmation coverage
[for Kagan]" and "reason[ing] that the totality of material published by the newspapers would be a fair sample
of the complete universe of confirmation coverage generated by all media," while also noting that "[t]o learn
how three large newspapers [including the New York Times and the Washington Post] framed the confirmation
process for their readers is ... to gain a good understanding of how the media as a whole represented Kagan's
journey from the committee hearings to the final vote"); Davis, supra note 38, at 1073, 1075 (using the New
York Times to conduct empirical study comparing the "[p]ress coverage of six recent controversial nominees
from the period of 1986-1991 . . . with the press coverage of six nominees from the period 1969-1971");
Xenos, supra note 164, at 492 (analyzing all stories appearing in the New York Times during the Alito
nomination period, and "allow[ing] the Times to represent mainstream newspaper coverage and also to serve
as the reference point for our investigation of blog coverage, literally treating it as a 'paper of record').
220. NEMACHECK, supra note 186, at 26 ("Once the candidate to the Court is announced by the
president, the confirmation stage of the nomination process officially begins.").
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nomination 221 to the date confirmed by the Senate or withdrawn from candidacy within
the date range of 1971 to 2010.222 The collection is housed in a specialized, searchable
electronic collection developed by librarians at Michigan State University College of
Law John F. Schaefer Law Library.
223
Once complete, we created a comprehensive list of over fifty variables to be
coded for each article in the collection. The variables embrace a range of information
about the articles and can be broken down into three distinct categories. First, we coded
for characteristics without regard to the substance of the article, like word count,
placement within the newspaper, name and sex of the author, and whether a photo
accompanied the article.2 24 Second, we examined a number of variables related to the
actual content of each piece. Did the article mention, for example, the parental or
marital status of the nominee, the nominee's views on abortion and other issues, or the
nominee's appearance? Finally, we coded for a series of nuanced elements of the article
like the tone of the headline, lead paragraph, and overall article, as well as whether
gender was mentioned in relation to the nomination.
The coding tool was created and used to perform textual analysis of each article.
Following the design of the coding tool and preliminary coder training, the reliability
221. Because our focus is on the media coverage of nominees, sometimes we made a decision to begin
analysis of the nomination period on the dayfollowing the President's announcement. An announcement of a
nominee by the President on one day might not yield media coverage until the next due to constraints of news
publication schedules. As an example, Justice Sotomayor's nomination was made public at noon on May 26,
but newspaper coverage of the nomination did not occur until the following day, May 27. For purposes of our
study, the analysis of Sotomayor's coverage began on May 27.
222. Although our original search included any article in which the nominee's name appeared, we
ultimately refined the field to include only articles that were explicitly about the nominee or nomination in
question. This sufficiently narrowed our dataset and furthered our interest in capturing how the nominees are
portrayed by media. Other studies using the New York Times or the Washington Post to evaluate media
coverage of Alito and Kagan during their nomination period followed a similar process. For example,
Professor Bybee's study of newspaper coverage during the Kagan nomination period, which he defined as
June 28, 2010 to August 5, 2010, yielded twenty-two news articles and ten editorial/op-ed pieces from the New
York Times, and forty-one news articles and twenty-four editorial/op-ed pieces from the Washington Post.
Bybee, supra note 24, at 146 tbl. 1. To collect the articles used in his study, Bybee used the built-in search tool
for each paper's website. Id. at 145; see also Xenos, supra note 164, at 493 ("Our Lexis-Nexis search of [New
York] Times stories featuring 'Alito' in the headline or lead paragraphs between October 29 th 2005 and
February 7th 2006 yielded a total of 264 stories. Filtering out duplicate stories, unsigned editorials, and items
that fell below a minimum threshold of 325 words (mainly corrections and simple photo captions) reduced the
corpus to 153 stories.").
223. The data collection was conducted at the Michigan State University College of Law John F.
Schaefer Law Library by reference librarian Brent Domann. A research assistant gathered newspaper articles
by searching commercial databases. New York Times articles from 1980 to the present were taken from
Westlaw, and Washington Post articles from 1980 to the present were taken from Lexis Academic. Articles
prior to 1980 were gathered from the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database. Each nominee was searched
within each source by name and with dates restricted to those during which the nominee was a candidate, that
is, from the date of the nomination announcement until the date of confirmation or the date the nominee was
withdrawn as a candidate. The citations for results were saved and later retrieved by batch due to the sheer
volume of search results (roughly 4,000). All search hits were filtered for duplicate entries and false positive
hits. The resulting materials were saved as Microsoft Word, text, or Adobe PDF files and were subsequently
loaded into an electronic collection tool built with Greenstone software.
224. Although analyzing the actual photographs is well beyond the scope of the initial phase of the
project, we may embark on such analysis at a later point.
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of the tool was assessed informally though a percentage agreement analysis of three
coders across thirty-eight indicators for fifteen randomly selected articles. After the
coding tool was updated and refined 225 and additional coding instructions were
provided to all independent coders, an official pilot test was conducted on a random
sample set of five articles, by three independent coders, across fifty-four separately
coded indicators. The results of the pilot test were analyzed using Krippendorffs
alpha 226 due to its ability to ascertain reliability across various levels of data while also
accounting for chance agreement among coders. 227 Reliabilities ranged from a high of
1.0 (no variability among coders) to 0.7. Although some research may require a higher
metric for agreement (0.8 or higher), the exploratory nature of this research as well as
the limited number of items used for reliability testing suggests that this is a
sufficiently high reliability measure. 228 One variable-mentions of sexual orientation
of the nominee-had an alpha below 0.5 and was removed from subsequent analysis.
Explicit parameters for our content analysis appear in a comprehensive coding
protocol, the Codebook.2 29 Two research assistants working under our direction
completed the actual coding process. The research assistants received comprehensive
training, including lengthy review of the Codebook. They were not advised of our
research hypotheses, however. The data findings were analyzed using IBM SPSS
predictive analytics software.
Throughout the process of conducting the Media Study, in addition to overseeing
the coding of articles in our collection, we each individually read hundreds of articles
about the sixteen nominees to the Court. This process has revealed an extensive amount
of information responsive to our questions about the connections between gender and
the media's portrayal of Supreme Court nominees. As a whole, our research supports
the claims made by other scholars that "[w]hen the media cover women leaders, they
are often portrayed in a stereotypical manner."230
Our Media Study is being conducted in phases. This Article documents the results
from Phase One, which focuses on coverage by the New York Times and the
Washington Post during the first week that follows the announcement of a nominee by
the President (i.e., the introduction week). Phase Two will examine the same media
sources during a different time period, the confirmation hearing. Later phases may
include coding all articles appearing during the entire confirmation process as well as
online blog coverage of the nominees.
225. NEUENDORF, supra note 191, at 132 ("The goal in creating codebooks and coding forms is to make
the set so complete and unambiguous as to almost eliminate the individual differences among coders.").
226. The program ReCal3 was utilized for calculations. ReCal3 is a freely available Internet program
specifically designed to calculate various intercoder reliability metrics, including Krippendorf's alpha, for
three or more coders of categorical level data. See generally Matthew Lombard et al., Content Analysis in
Mass Communication: Assessment and Reporting of lntercoder Reliability, 28 HUM. COMM. RES. 587 (2002).
227. RIFFE ET AL., supra note 193, at 132-33.
228. See generally Klaus Krippendorff, Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common Misconceptions
and Recommendations, 30 HuM. COMM. REs. 411 (2004).
229. At the conclusion of this project, we plan to make the Codebook as well as the complete coding
dataset available to researchers and others with an interest in the media's portrayal of Supreme Court
nominees.
230. KLENKE, supra note 56, at 118.
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We define the introduction week as the seven days that follow the President's
announcement of a nominee. We chose to focus on this period first because the sample
offers a sufficient body of data to conduct a rigorous content analysis and also allows
us to contrast media coverage between the introduction period and other points in time
during the nomination process. Other scholars have followed similar selection criteria.
Professor and journalist Mark Obbie, for example, conducted a content analysis of the
"[riesults-oriented legal journalism" 231 surrounding Justice Alito's confirmation
process. 232 Obbie selected the first week of news stories for his analysis because it
captures the time period during which most media consumers "form first impressions
of a nominee." 233 Further, he notes that "[t]he news coverage at first is intense, then it
recedes, with occasional bursts of activity; and finally it spikes during the Senate's
deliberations." 2
34
Before presenting our results, several research limitations should be noted. First,
although the New York Times and the Washington Post are generally acknowledged as
appropriate sources for conducting representative content analysis and empirical
studies, we acknowledge that a survey of additional newspapers may be informative.
Similarly, Phase One of this project examines only eight days of media coverage, so it
is limited in scope and provides only a snapshot of the total coverage during the
confirmation period. Dozens if not hundreds of articles were written about each
nominee during the time between the announcement and confirmation or withdrawal.
The introduction week includes approximately ten to fifteen percent of the total
coverage a nominee received. For example, 386 articles appeared in the Washington
Post and New York Times about Kagan, only fifty-seven of which were published
during the introduction week.
We also recognize that some might suggest our focus on the media's portrayal of
nominee appearances based upon gender simply perpetuates the problem. As Katherine
Bartlett observes, "[a] problem for feminists is that calling attention to the importance
of dress and appearance matters may reinforce that importance and, accordingly, the
power of dress and appearance norms to oppress women." 235 Although this might be a
risk, we believe it is a risk worth taking because of the benefits that might be realized
from addressing gendered media portrayals of Supreme Court nominees in a scholarly,
scientific way.
231. Obbie defines results-oriented legal journalism as "reporting on the outcome of a court case without
acknowledging the legal authority that the court cited in reaching that outcome." Obbie, supra note 219, at 159
(emphasis omitted).
232. Obbie's research focuses exclusively on the nomination of Justice Alito to the Supreme Court. He is
critical of the news media's tendency to omit critical details in their reporting on the record of Supreme Court
nominees, characterizing their tendency as "one of sloppiness and ignorance." Id. at 154. He is concerned by
the misinformation that is communicated to the masses. Obbie asserts, "[wlhen journalists boil all substance
out of the law before serving it to the public, they distort the meaning of the rule of law." Id.
233. Id. at 162.
234. Id.
235. Bartlett, supra note 107, at 2580. Bartlett notes that "[t]he dilemma is the same one feminists face
in addressing the larger matter of sexual difference: taking account of sexual difference reinforces it, which in
turn, at present, means reinforcing sex-based disadvantage." Id. (footnote omitted). Further, "responding to
dress and appearance matters as important participates in the validation of appearance as a basis for judging
individuals and, thereby, for constraining women." Id.
2012]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, we do not mean to suggest that power is found only in a position
like Supreme Court Justice; rather, it seems that if the most highly accomplished and
credentialed women in the legal profession remain subject to bias and stereotyping in
the media, surely many other women in the profession experience these phenomena to
a certain degree as well. As touched upon in the foregoing literature review, there are
also other important, interesting ways of looking at the media's depiction of Supreme
Court nominees that are simply beyond the scope of this Article, such as the influence
of race in the media's depiction of nominees2 36 or the influence of media in shaping
public opinion.
237
Finally, the Media Study does not purport to demonstrate the concrete
consequences of the gendered media coverage documented by our research. We leave
for future scholars and researchers the task of evaluating the extent of the harm caused
by the disparate treatment identified by our study, and predict, based upon the
preliminary findings, that future research will identify at least one aspect of harm to be
the reluctance of qualified women to enter and/or remain in the legal profession's
pipeline to power. Further, and perhaps most importantly, we agree with Kathleen Hall
Jamieson's assessment that "[t]he first step in overcoming a double bind is seeing it for
what it is."2 38 To this end, our Media Study illuminates many of the gendered binds
that confront women.
III. FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF NOMINEES IN THE MEDIA: THE INTRODUCTION WEEK
A. Study Results
We established a number of hypotheses based upon anecdotal observations about
the media's coverage of recent nominees to the Supreme Court. Each hypothesis was
united by a common theme that evaluates whether a relationship exists between the
gender of Supreme Court nominees and how they are portrayed by the media. We are
mindful that our preconceived ideas about gender and the coverage of nominees
necessarily required the use of an objective measure to evaluate the media coverage;
this informed our decision to undertake a quantitative study. The preliminary findings
generated from Phase One of our content analysis, focusing exclusively on the
introduction week for each nominee, demonstrate that news coverage is emblematic of
the persistent struggle for equal access to and ascension in the power pipeline for
women in the legal profession. This conclusion is supported by an overarching theme
in our preliminary findings exposing a subtle but pervasive and striking gender
imbalance in the coverage of nominees. To be clear, this first phase of research offers
only preliminary findings. The data is illuminating, and in many instances informs our
refinement of existing questions for further study and uncovers an entirely new set of
questions to be considered in future research. Our preliminary findings are a first point
of inquiry into a realm deserving of significant attention; we hope that other scholars
236. See supra note 22 for a source discussing media coverage of Justice Clarence Thomas.
237. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of media in shaping
public opinion.
238. JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 190.
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will join this discussion and we look forward to sharing results of our own subsequent
research. Set forth below are our preliminary findings along with a discussion of the
relevant results from the content analysis covering the introduction week of media
coverage for the Supreme Court nominees.
Preliminary Finding 1: Female nominees receive more coverage (in terms of
quantity and length of articles) than male nominees during the introduction week.
We were somewhat surprised by the results about the quantity of media coverage
of male and female nominees. Initially, we predicted that male nominees would receive
more coverage than female nominees, but this is not reflected in the data. Rather, we
observed that, on average, there was actually more media coverage of the female
nominees, at least in terms of the number of articles written, and to a lesser extent the
number of words written. We speculate that one possible rationale for this phenomenon
is that justices who deviate from the white, male, married, heterosexual norm are
written about more frequently perhaps because of their relative novelty.
The average number of articles written about female nominees during the
introduction week was 54.2 articles, compared to an average of 47.7 articles written
about the male nominees. Independent sample t-tests indicated that this relationship
was not statistically significant, however (t=0.546, p=0.594). 239 The trend also favored
women for the average length of the story, with the female nominees averaging 1,081.4
words per story and males averaging 959.1. An independent samples t-test indicated
that this difference was statistically significant (t=2.191, p=0.029). Counter to the
direction of the hypotheses, the data indicates that female nominees receive more
coverage in terms of number of articles and that these articles tend to be longer stories.
The total word count for male and female nominees is documented in the table
below.240
Nominee Articles Word Count
Kagan 57 43,887
Sotomayor 78 78,043
Miers 62 60,023
Ginsburg 44 55,173
O'Connor 30 30,505
Alito 68 66,247
Roberts 98 94,529
Breyer 26 31,698
Thomas 57 55,173
Souter 55 55,686
239. See infra Table 3 for data on the average number of articles written about male and female
nominees during the introduction week.
240. The articles written about Powell and Rehnquist were retrieved using an alternate search
mechanism which did not generate word counts, so they are not included in our analysis for this variable.
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Kennedy 25 23,839
Bork 43 41,800
Scalia 44 41,276
Stevens* 21 12,754
Powell* 29 n/a
Rehnquist* 37 n/a
Preliminary Finding 2: The gender or sexuality of female nominees is
mentioned more frequently than the gender or sexuality of male nominees during the
introduction week.
The mention of a nominee's gender or sexuality can be seen as both positive and
negative. On the one hand, reporting that a nominee is a woman emphasizes the
importance of diversity (or lack of diversity). It also can be seen as celebrating the
achievement of a previously excluded group as having attained elite status. On the
other hand, focus on a nominee's gender or sexuality can distract from reporting on a
nominee's qualifications and merit for the position. It also can perpetuate stereotypes
and token status.
Not surprisingly, as the first female nominee to the Court, O'Connor's gender was
referenced in numerous articles. In some instances, the reference was positive; that is,
acknowledging the history of exclusion for women in the law and identifying her
nomination as a step forward. For example, one reporter referenced the words of
Phyllis Segal, then-director of the National Organization for Women's Legal Defense
and Education Fund, who spoke of "Myra Bradwell's failure to crack the Illinois bar, of
Belle Mansfield's success in 1869, in the more tolerant state of Iowa, in becoming the
nation's first woman admitted to the bar" and contextualized "Judge O'Connor as a
pioneer[ing] woman." 241 Years later, noting the historic occasion presented by three
women Supreme Court Justices, another reporter observed this "was a benchmark that
women's law groups celebrated as a major step toward a sex parity that has eluded the
United States Supreme Court compared with the highest courts of several states and
countries." 2
42
We observed that most references to gender in the headlines, however, were
negative; that is, distracting from the reporting on the nominee's merit, perpetuating
stereotypes, and/or undermining the nominee's qualifications. At times this is seen
subtly in headlines like "The Nomination of Mrs. O'Connor."243 The seemingly subtle
reference to gender takes on a different significance, however, when considering that
O'Connor is the only nominee whose name included "Mr.," "Mrs.," or "Ms." in a
241. Francis X. Clines, About Washington; An Occupation of Civil Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1981, § 1,
at 8.
242. Mark Leibovich, Reshaping Court's Culture, a Woman at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, at
A15.
243. Editorial, The Nomination of Mrs. O'Connor, WASH. POST, July 8, 1981, at A22; see also Only
Ultras Fight Mrs. O'Connorfor the High Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1981, § 4, at 1.
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headline, reflecting further stereotyping.244 There are also explicit negative references
in the articles themselves. For example, one reporter quoted a source who characterized
O'Connor's voice as "high-pitched. . . , almost like a young girl's" and another who
attributed her election to a judgeship on the Maricopa County Superior Court to "the
year of the woman" where "[e]very woman on the ballot in the state of Arizona won
that year. '245 Another reporter described the nomination of O'Connor as politically
"cute." 246
As an additional example of explicit references to O'Connor's gender that
distracted from reporting on her qualifications and merit for the position, the reporter in
one article highlighted President Reagan's "mistake" in which he "admitted that his
appointment of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor . . . culminated a search for a highly
qualified woman" and "contradicted the official White House position that selection of
the nation's first female justice had nothing to do with her sex." 247 Another reported
that "Judge O'Connor had never been an activist on any issues related to feminism."
248
The gender of female nominees continued to be a focus of media coverage even
after the first woman was confirmed to the Court. When the second woman was
nominated, one author urged senators to in the headline to: "Treat Judge Ginsburg Like
a Man."2 49 Another reporter noted that Ginsburg's "whole career, not only her gender,"
rendered her qualified for the position.25 The New York Times and the Washington
Post repeatedly reminded readers of Harriet Miers's fondness for "girls' nights out"
25
'
244. For a discussion on the use of honorifics by the media, see JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 165-66.
Jamieson notes that "[i]n 1977 the UPI Stylebook instructed reporters not to 'use Mr. in any reference unless it
is combined with Mrs.' .... [and] the style manual currently in use at the Philadelphia Inquirer makes no
distinction," directing that reporters "not use the courtesy titles Miss, Mr., Mrs., or Ms.' Id. Interestingly,
although not appearing in the headlines, a number of articles for female and male nominees included
honorifics within the body of the article. For example, seven articles referenced "Ms. Sotomayor," eight
referenced "Mr. Alito," and fourteen referenced "Mr. Roberts" in the article text. To find these references, we
used a search function to scan the text of each set of justice-specific articles. For example, in the set of articles
about Sotomayor, we searched for "Ms. Sotomayor" in the collection. The search revealed seven articles that
we subsequently read individually to ensure the accuracy of the search results.
245. Fred Barbash & Ted Gup, Trailblazer; Still Deeply Rooted in the Ranch, Pioneer's Kin Nears High
Court; Court Nominee Preserves Pioneer Tradition, WASH. POST, July 12, 1981, at Al. Another year dubbed
"The Year of the Woman" was 1992, about which Senator Barbara Mikulski observed: "I personally didn't
like the title. Like we only get one year per century. Like the year of the dog. The year of the zebra."
JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 167.
246. Richard Cohen, Politics; O'Connor Nomination Is Very Clever Politics, WASH. POST, July 14,
1981, at BI ("It is interesting, then, that a whole bunch of people, liberals included, think that Ronald Reagan's
nomination of Sandra O'Connor is cute-very clever politics. It puts a woman on the court, therefore fulfilling
a campaign promise .... ").
247. Howell Raines, Reagan's Shift to the Center Raises Clamor on the Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
1981, § 4, at I (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. Steven R. Weisman, White House Rebuts Charges that Nominee Has Voted for Abortions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 1981, at A17.
249. Kathleen Quinn, Treat Judge Ginsburg Like a Man, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1993, § 4, at 17.
250. See Mr. Clinton Picks a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at A26 (stating that Ginsburg's career
and gender stand for the principle of accepting or rejecting people and ideas on their merits, rather than
prejudice or stereotypes).
251. Todd S. Purdum & Neil A. Lewis, Hard- Working Advocate for the President, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2005, at AI.
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to engage in "a lot of girl talk" '252 with "Condi and the other single girls," 253 referencing
then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Even with the most recent nomination of
Kagan, the gendered focus persisted, with headlines such as "Reshaping Court's
Culture, a Woman at a Time" 254 appearing in media.
Beyond these anecdotal examples, however, lies a revealing empirical truth.
Stories about female nominees (n=272) mentioned their gender or sexuality more often
than stories about male nominees (n=503). 255 In over fifty percent of the articles written
about female nominees, the author referenced the nominee's gender or sexuality in
relation to the nomination. Conversely, almost none of the articles written about male
nominees mentioned their gender or sexuality. Even news coverage about the
nomination of Kagan referenced her gender repeatedly, despite the reality that a woman
on the Court was no longer a novelty. When reporters treat "women as exceptions,
[they] reinforce this assumption." 256 This in turn perpetuates a minority's token status,
even when, in reality, they may have moved well beyond being the "first" or "only"
woman in such a role.
Although extensive analysis of race is beyond the scope of Phase One of our
Media Study, we were also struck by the numerous references to a nominee's race
when the nominee was not white. The relatively small number of Justices represented
in the Media Study does not permit formal statistical analyses to be conducted for this
intersection; descriptive statistics, however, are revealing. In the articles about Thomas,
for example, his race was explicitly mentioned in seventy-four percent of the articles.
In the case of Sotomayor, mention of her race occurred in ninety-four percent of the
articles; perhaps as the first Latina woman nominated to the Court, the unique
intersection of race and gender contributed to this phenomenon. We find this data
compelling; it suggests that indeed we have not yet moved beyond pervasive disparity,
at least in terms of drawing attention to minority status. Gender and race, as deviations
from the white, male, married, heterosexual norm, still tend to be perceived as novel
and newsworthy.
Sometimes the racial and gender differences are discussed in the context of how
the nominees will rule on cases before the bench. 257 Indeed, the media scrutinizes the
nominees' own remarks about the relevance of their background or experiences. For
example, both Sotomayor and Alito made comments before their nominations about
252, Elisabeth Bumiller, A Place at the Table for Miers and High-Level Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2005, at Al7.
253. Michael Grunwald et al., A Deep Dedication to the President, and to Her Work, WASH. POST, Oct.
4, 2005, at AO1.
254. Leibovich, supra note 242.
255. See infra Table 4 for statistics showing that articles were more likely to mention physical
appearance when the nominee discussed was female.
256. JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 167.
257. See James Oliphant & David G. Savage, The Nation: Sotomayor Hearings Show Diverse Takes on
Diversity, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at 3 (noting that several legal experts believe that "Sotomayor's Puerto
Rican heritage and Bronx upbringing will have an effect inside the Supreme Court").
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how their personal life experiences may impact their decisions, 258 but the way in which
these comments were portrayed differed significantly. In a lecture in 2001 on the role
her background played in her jurisprudence, Sotomayor said, "I would hope that a wise
Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a
better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life. ' 2 59 Sotomayor was
vilified in the media for this remark, and President Obama was taken to task for
selecting a nominee based upon qualities that included "empathy." 260 Although our
coding did not specifically capture the quantity of media attention devoted to this quote
itself, our analysis revealed that indeed a majority of articles included a reference to
these particular words. A New York Times article reveals how this gendered double
standard plays out:
Judge Sotomayor has fueled the discussion by suggesting that gender and
ethnic heritage can play a role in judicial decision-making. Yet Judge
Samuel A. Alito Jr., nominated by [President] Bush in 2006, made similar
remarks, telling senators that in cases involving immigration, "I can't help
but think of my own ancestors."
26
'
The sentiments expressed surrounding the impact of Alito's Italian "ancestors"
and Sotomayor's Latina heritage are strikingly similar; yet, the media focus differed
substantially, and the fallout from Sotomayor's remarks resonated continually during
her nomination. Contrast the first President George Bush's praise for his Supreme
Court nominee Clarence Thomas, describing him as "a warm, intelligent person who
has great empathy." 262 Another point of comparison is the emphasis placed on
Sotomayor's ancestry. Multiple articles referenced her Latina background in the first
line,2 63 whereas the ancestry of other nominees, if even mentioned, appears later in the
article, if not the last paragraph, as was the case in a reporter's mention of Scalia "who
would be the first Justice on the Court of Italian descent.
' 264
More recently, the media has explicitly scrutinized the sexuality of female
nominees. For example, one reporter observed that "double-entendre wisecracks about
Kagan's softball prowess were all the rage on Fox News and MSNBC. ' '265 This same
reporter noted that "[t]hose rumors have chased all unmarried Supreme Court justices
258. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Buzzwords Shape the Debate over Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2009, at A15 (noting Justice Alito's admission that he "think[s] of [his] own ancestors" when faced with
immigration cases).
259. Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Chooses Hispanic Judge for Supreme Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2009, at Al.
260. Id.
261. Stolberg, supra note 258.
262. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Say It With Feeling? Not This Time Around, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at
A15.
263. See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Obama Says Judge Regrets Wording; GOP Leaders Try to Rein
in Reactions to Sotomayor's 2001 Speech, WASH. POST, May 30, 2009, at AO1 (stating that President Obama
said Sotomayor regrets saying a "wise Latina" would make better decisions than a white male); David M.
Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Parties Plot Strategy as Sotomayor Visits Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, at
A20 (stating that Senate Democrats sought to defuse criticism of Sotomayor's comment that a Latina judge
like herself might have better judgment than a white male).
264. James Reston, Hear Ye in the Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1986, at A35.
265. Frank Rich, Op-Ed., A Heaven-Sent Rent Boy, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010, at WK10.
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or would-be justices loathed by the right, whether Republicans like David Souter and
Harriet Miers or the previous Obama choice, Sonia Sotomayor." 266 Our Media Study
showed, however, that although rumors might indeed have floated about Souter, his
sexual orientation was not explicitly mentioned, at least in articles that appeared during
the introduction week. Our future research will reveal whether this remains the case
throughout the duration of the nomination period.
Although not effectively documented through quantitative analysis, we did
observe in the qualitative analysis explicit attention paid to the sexual orientation of
single, female nominees Kagan and Sotomayor. This fascination plays out in several
ways, sometimes intersecting with issues of marriage and children, but often lending
itself to discussion of whether Kagan or Sotomayor are lesbians. There is an air of
confusion, trying to proffer explanations for their unmarried "plight." An article in the
Washington Post explained about Kagan, "[s]he's not gay, okay? Actually, the all-too-
public discussion about the ought-to-be private topic of Elena Kagan's sexuality would
be easier if the Supreme Court nominee were gay."267 Sotomayor's sexual orientation
was discussed far less frequently than Kagan's, intersecting tangentially with the
extensive attention paid to her gender and race. None of the media coverage of the male
nominees to the Court focused on their sexual orientation in this way. The data
generated from our Media Study related to issues of gender, race, and sexuality leads us
to conclude that the standard by which Supreme Court nominees are assessed in the
media is one against the backdrop of a white, married, male, heterosexual norm. We
speculate that this is emblematic of the standard by which leaders in the legal
profession generally are assessed, too.
Preliminary Finding 3: The limited sample of articles tends to show that
appearance of female nominees is mentioned more frequently than the appearance
of male nominees, but more data is needed
We used two different approaches to examine how the media constructs
appearance. First, we asked whether the nominee's appearance generally was
mentioned within the text of the article. 268 Second, we asked whether a photograph was
included along with the text. The results of both inquiries are illuminating.
The evaluation of appearance within the article text included several variables,
ranging from mentions of general appearance to more specific appearance variables
such as body posture and physical traits. A series of independent t-tests revealed that
the general hypothesis regarding more frequent references to appearance for female
nominees could not be supported given the few number of articles mentioning
appearance during the introduction period, regardless of nominee gender (t=<1.34,
p=>0.203).
266. Id.
267. Ruth Marcus, Editorial, Smart Women, Fewer Choices, WASH. POST, May 14, 2010, at AI5
(paragraph break omitted).
268. As a related matter, we also coded for more specific aspects of how appearance was discussed, like
body posture, inherent trait, or adornment (clothing, pantyhose, etc.). Those distinctions may be explored in
greater detail in future work.
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Although not statistically significant, the data referencing appearance does
identify a trend that we intend to explore more fully during subsequent phases of
analysis. The appearance of female nominees was mentioned more than twice as often
as the male nominees, though the number of articles proved too small a sample from
which to derive significant conclusions. The overall percentage of articles in which
appearance is mentioned is lower than we anticipated, at eleven percent for female
nominees and five percent for male nominees, but we nonetheless find the data
informative. Among the sixteen nominees we studied, Elena Kagan and Sandra Day
O'Connor received the most media coverage of their appearance. Their appearance was
mentioned in sixteen and seventeen percent of the articles, respectively. Notably,
articles written about Kennedy, Scalia, and Powell during the introduction week
included no mention of their appearance.
We observed disparate gendered treatment of appearance not just in the number of
articles but also in the context in which appearance is discussed. For the female
nominees, appearance is likely to be couched in terms of, or connected to, their
qualifications, illustrating a version of the competence/appearance double bind. One
example of reporting on appearance as a qualification occurred during the Miers
nomination. Reporters noted that "Miers enjoys the absolute confidence of the
president, who once called her 'a pit bull in size 6 shoes' and that in her youth,
"Harriet was blond, pretty and athletic-she captained the tennis team as a senior, and
was voted 'best all around in sports'-but she was known as more serious than social.
While the cool girls wore bouffant hairdos, she wore a long braid wound modestly
around her head. '269 As another example, in an article conveying the excitement related
to Sotomayor's nomination from individuals in her native Puerto Rico, one author
conveyed that "Miss Puerto Rico gushed that Judge Sotomayor's selection by President
Obama proved that the island's women were not just beautiful. '270 It is difficult to
extract from this comment whether this is a "compliment," transcending the either/or
dichotomy of the double bind facing women about appearance-that, indeed,
Sotomayor is smart and beautiful-or whether the comment is more of an affront,
suggesting that, in fact, there are smart Puerto Rican women, like Sotomayor, in
addition to the beautiful ones. Either way, this news coverage suggests a complexity, as
we allude to in our literature review, on issues of appearance and competence.
For the male nominees, who also receive media attention surrounding their
appearance, the reporting is less connected to their qualifications or intelligence.
Consider an article written about Breyer, for example, that highlights his quirky
clothing preferences: "While working for the Senate Judiciary Committee, he once
wore the same suit, torn under the armpit, for six weeks running. His sweaters have
holes in them and his collars are frayed, even though his net worth is at least $3.6
million." 27' Here, Breyer's offbeat fashion sensibility is definitely criticized, but offset
and contextualized with his financial situation. Or take one of the first articles
269. Grunwatd et al., supra note 253.
270. Damien Cave, In Puerto Rico. Supreme Court Pick With Island Roots Becomes a Superstar, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2009, at A9.
271. David Margolick, Man in the News: The Supreme Court; Scholarly Consensus Builder: Stephen
Gerald Breyer, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, § 1, at 1.
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announcing President Bush's selection of Souter: "Judge Souter, a slight man wearing a
gray pinstripe suit and conservative navy blue tie, looked alternately bemused and
solemn as Mr. Bush fielded questions about the judge's position on abortion."2 72 A
second article reported that "[1]awyers here can tell you .... what he wears (his black
judge's robe was said to add color to his attire). '273 Discussion of Souter's attire in both
articles is descriptive, conveying the stereotypical image of what a judge is supposed to
look like-wearing a conservative suit or black judicial robe.
We also coded for the presence of a photograph to test the appearance hypothesis.
This variable was dichotomously coded. Unlike the other variables, this variable does
not speak directly to how members of the press perceive components of appearance and
their importance to the nominee. It does, however, indicate that photographic
representations of nominees are important to the narrative of the article. In this way, the
presence of photographs supported the general hypothesis. Of the total number of
articles written about female nominees, forty-two percent included a photograph.
Articles about male nominees, however, included a photograph only thirty percent of
the time. An independent t-test indicated that this difference was statistically significant
(t=3.31, p<0.001). We did not engage in analysis of the content of the photographs
themselves, but anecdotal observations suggest that women are depicted in a less
flattering light than men and lead us to suspect that the results of such a study would be
revealing.
Preliminary Finding 4: The limited sample of articles from the introduction
week reveals that the family life of female nominees tends to be mentioned more
frequently than the family life of male nominees, but more data is needed
To capture the media's portrayal of family status, we focused our analysis on two
interwoven, defining measures of family: marriage and parenthood. Specifically, we
were interested in how the media coverage portrayed the marital status (whether a
nominee was married or single or widowed) and parental status (whether the nominee
was a parent or childless) of each nominee, and coded the articles to capture these two
variables.
Under the umbrella of family life, we found that marital status was mentioned at
nearly the same frequency for male and female nominees, whereas parental status was
mentioned with slightly more frequency for female nominees than male nominees.
274
As with Preliminary Finding 3, more data is necessary to assess these variables because
they were mentioned so infrequently during the introductory period.275 Again, although
272. Maureen Dowd, Souter, New Hampshire Judge, Named by Bush for High Court; No 'Litmus Test,'
President Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at Al.
273. David Margolick, Bush's Court Choice; Ascetic at Home but Vigorous on Bench, N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 1990, at Al.
274. See infra Table 5 for data relating to the frequency of mentions of nominee family life by nominee
sex.
275. t=0.54, p=0.593. The low mean score (1.21 for females, 1.19 for males) indicates that this variable
was barely mentioned during the introductory period for either male or female nominees.
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not statistically significant due to the limited sample, we did observe trends that merit
further exploration during subsequent phases of research.
Marital Status
Marital status is mentioned in sixteen percent of the articles written about the
female nominees and thirteen percent of the articles written about the male nominees.
This is consistent with Kathleen Hall Jamieson's study of print coverage on federal
elections featuring women in 1990, 1992, and 1993, where she found that "women in
political articles are identified in spousal or parental roles more often than men." 276 Our
qualitative analysis of the articles further revealed that when marital status is
mentioned, there is often a gendered characterization. For female nominees, the
coverage focuses more frequently on the spousal obligations of a nominee who is also a
wife, rather than merely a mention of marital status in passing (which is more
commonly the case for male nominees). For example, in "The Man Behind the High
Court Nominee," a reporter for the New York Times wrote that "[e]ven though she had
established an extraordinary record as a lawyer and teacher, Ms. Ginsburg has
acknowledged that without the strong personal and political support of her husband,
she may never have become President Clinton's choice for the Supreme Court. 2177 In
the Washington Post, Ginsburg's husband was named "The Spouse of Ruth; Marty
Ginsburg, the Pre-Feminism Feminist."278 Among the more interesting passages from
this article is a reflection on Ginsburg's skills as a new wife, describing her as a
"complex young woman with large ambitions, [who] placed a lumpy mass of tortured
protein on a plate in front of the person she had recently married," insisting it was "tuna
fish casserole." 27
9
The reporting on female nominees' marital status also reinforces stereotypes. For
example, an article on O'Connor observed that "[t]he job wasn't something she or her
family needed. They were already respected and well-heeled. They enjoyed what
everyone, including her husband, an attorney with one of Phoenix's most prestigious
corporate law firms, describes as a comfortable family life. '280 This article suggests
that as a well-to-do wife, she did not desire a more powerful career. Other articles also
focused on her balancing of the homemaker/career bind. One observed that "[tlhe
couple's relationship is thought to be so harmonious that they were once asked to put
on a skit for a group of women bankers called 'how to combine two successful careers
and a successful marriage in 199 steps."'281 Another noted that "[w]hile Judge
O'Connor is most often described as a diligent, nononsense [sic] woman, always ready
to move up the next notch of success, close friends say that in private she talks frankly
276. JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 169-70.
277. Stephen Labaton, The Man Behind the High Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1993, at Al.
278. Jay Mathews, The Spouse of Ruth; Marty Ginsburg, the Pre-Feminism Feminist, WASH. POST, June
19, 1993, at BI.
279. Id.
280. Barbash & Gup, supra note 245.
281. Id.
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of working hard to be both a successful public figure and a successful wife and
mother."2
82
By comparison, with male nominees, marital status is noted primarily as basic
biographic information. For example, the New York Times reported that Kennedy "has
been married to the same woman for 24 years, has sent all three of his children to his
alma mater, Stanford University, and lives in the same white colonial-style house in
Sacramento, behind a camelia [sic] bush and a neat row of gardenias, where he was
born 51 years ago."2 83 Similarly, for Thomas, the New York Times reported that "his
first marriage, from which he has one son, Jamal, began to come apart. He has since
married Virginia Lamp, who works on legislation for the United States Labor
Department. '2
84
The Media Study results for nominees without spouses are also notable. Only four
nominees to the Court since the early 1970s have been unmarried: Souter, Miers,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Interestingly, for Souter, marital status was mentioned in
fifteen percent of the articles, compared to nine percent for Miers, five percent for
Sotomayor, and sixteen percent for Kagan. More revealing, perhaps, than the data on
this point is the tone of the headlines as well as the articles themselves, which evidence
a different treatment for female nominees without a spouse. For example, the media
focused on Miers's single status, including references to her "girls' nights out" 285 and
one article reporting that "[h]er red Mercedes-Benz was such a fixture in the West
Wing lot that colleagues called it an abandoned car; she has never married or had
children, and some of her friends believe she has sacrificed her personal life for
work.
'286
Or consider as another example the article "Sotomayor: A Single Supreme?,"
which reported, with exuberance, that there was yet "[a]nother first on the Supreme
Court! If Sonia Sotomayor is confirmed, she'll be its first . . .bachelorette." 287 The
article goes on to describe her first failed "college marriage," her subsequent "fizzled"
engagement to Peter White, and her current single status.288 The author projects pity on
Sotomayor: "Who's going to accompany her to those fancy White House dinners?"
289
Another article appearing in the New York Times, titled "A Trail Blazer and a
Dreamer," reported that Sotomayor, "[d]ivorced and with no children .... [she] enjoys
the ballet and theater."2 90 The Washington Post ran the headline "Friends Provide
Glimpse Into Nominee's 'Very Full Life,"' noting that, "[a] 54-year-old divorced
282. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Woman in the News; 'A Reputation for Excelling', N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
198 1, at Al.
283, Robert Reinhold, Man in the News; Restrained Pragmatist Anthony M Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 1987, at Al.
284. Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: Man in the News; From Poverty to the Bench; Clarence
Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at Al.
285. Purdum & Lewis, supra note 251.
286. Grunwald et al., supra note 253.
287. Amy Argetsinger & Roxanne Roberts, Sotomayor: A Single Supreme?, WASH. POST, May 27, 2009,
at C03.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer anda Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A 1.
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woman who never had children, Sotomayor is said to be a workaholic who fills her free
time with a huge network of close friends, extended family members, colleagues,
former classmates and just about anyone else who has entered her circle." 291 The article
went on to cite friends as saying that "[o]ut of deference to her privacy, the one topic
[of] Sotomayor's [they] won't discuss is her personal relationships." 292 But the
reporters made sure to confirm "that Sotomayor 'does date.'
293
The novelty of the nomination of the first single woman to the Supreme Court did
not wear off even after Sotomayor was confirmed. The headline, "Then Comes the
Marriage Question," appeared during Kagan's nomination. 294 The author wrote:
Here we go again.
For the second time in a year, a childless, unmarried woman in her 50s
has been nominated to be a justice on the Supreme Court and the critics have
come out swinging. This time Elena Kagan, the former dean of Harvard's
law school, who is now solicitor general, has been described as having sacri-
ficed a home and personal life in her quest for a brilliant legal career.
295
Another article went a step further, beyond just acknowledging the sacrifice that
Kagan made for her career. Instead, the way her unmarried status was characterized is
reminiscent of the double binds that confront women; in this case, the message is that a
woman can be smart or married, but not both at the same time. "She really is a thinker,"
a colleague said. 296 "She is not married and she doesn't have family in her life. Her
books are, in many ways, her companions. She has a lot of friends. But she's lived
alone, and the world of books and ideas is her world.
297
In contrast, of Souter's decision not to marry, media coverage during the
introduction week referenced his marital status primarily in the context of responding
to criticism that he might not be empathetic to women's issues, as seen in the following
headline: "Former Souter Girlfriend Says He's Fair-Minded. ' 298 The article quoted his
former girlfriend as stating, "[h]aving never married, I know everyone is wondering
does he have the empathy to understand women's issues, and I think he would. It's not
as though he has lived in a cave for the last 25 years."299 A second headline questioned
"Does Souter Have Heart?," with the reporter characterizing him as "[a] loner, but not
lonely, and not without humor, he's invariably described as an independent man, never
married, who lives alone and keeps his own counsel."300
291. Keith B. Richburg et al., Friends Provide Glimpse into Nominee's 'Very Full Life', WASH. POST,
May 31, 2009, at A08.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Holson, supra note 16.
295. Id. (paragraph break omitted).
296. Amy Goldstein et al., A History of Pragmatism Over Partisanship, WASH. POST, May 11, 2010, at
A01.
297. Id.
298. Judy Mann, Former Souter Girlfriend Says He's Fair-Minded, WASH. POST, July 27, 1990, at C3.
299. Id.
300. Haynes Johnson, Does Souter Have Heart?, WASH. POST, July 27, 1990, at Al.
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Parental Status
We expected to find that that the parental status of nominees would be mentioned
more frequently for female nominees than male nominees. Contrary to these
expectations, our quantitative analysis revealed that parental status was actually
mentioned with the same frequency for both male and female nominees (in exactly
eight percent of all articles regardless of gender). As with marital status, a significant
difference in media coverage between male and female nominees was observed in our
qualitative analysis, specifically in the nuanced ways through which parental status is
reported.
Recent headlines have been explicit in evaluating, scrutinizing, and criticizing the
nominees based on issues of motherhood (or nonmotherhood, as in the case of three
female nominees). For example, six days after President Obama announced Kagan's
nomination, the Washington Post ran an article by reporter Ann Gerhart with the
following headline: "The Case for More Mothers."30 1 The story articulates how alive
and well the maternal double bind continues to be, even a decade into the twenty-first
century:
Motherhood offers a one-word verifier. It signals a woman with an
intensity of life experiences, jammed with joys and fears, unpredictability
and intimacy, all outside the workplace. Much of the time, it's the opposite
of being strategic and assiduously prepared.3 °2
Two days later, the New York Times ran an article entitled "Judging Women," in
which author Lisa Belkin observed:
If Elena Kagan is confirmed by the Senate, there will be three women on
the Supreme Court for the first time. This is a measure of how far women
have come. Two will be single and childless. This may be a measure of
something else entirely.
30 3
It should be acknowledged that the media also mentioned Souter's lack of
children, but the coverage was not nearly as pervasive or as bound up in the success of
his career. 304
Notably, none of the male nominees' domestic abilities, such as cooking skills,
received news coverage. By contrast, the media reported that O'Connor enjoyed a
reputation as "an excellent cook and a lover of fine wines" 305 and that Ginsburg was
"phased... out of the kitchen at a relatively early age" because her children found their
father to be a better cook.306 Likewise, Miers was reported to be "a terrible cook. '307
301. Gerhart, supra note 17.
302. Id.
303. Lisa Belkin, Judging Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at MMI1.
304. See supra notes 287-304 for a comparison of the media coverage of Souter's marital and parental
status with that of Sotomayor and Kagan.
305. John M. Crewdson, Nominee for High Court: A Record Defying Labels, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1981,
§ 1,at 1.
306. Guy Gugliotta & Eleanor Randolph, A Mentor, Role Model, and Heroine of Feminist Lawyers,
WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at A14.
307. Grunwald et al., supra note 253.
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Both O'Connor and Ginsburg also were described with strong stereotypical
metaphors related to their roles as mothers. For example, the New York Times reported
that "[w]hile Judge O'Connor is most often described as a diligent, nononsense [sic]
woman, always ready to move up the next notch of success, close friends say that in
private she talks frankly of working hard to be both a successful public figure and a
successful wife and mother."30 8 The Washington Post called Ginsburg "motherly
enough for traditionalists." 30 9 And an op-ed in the New York Times speculated about
"whether Ruth Bader Ginsburg had paid taxes for her household help and whom she'd
hired to care for her two children."3
10
When male nominees' parental status is discussed, it tends to be mentioned in
passing and not as a newsworthy topic warranting lengthy discussion. For example,
when Scalia's fatherhood was referenced, the coverage appeared briefly in connection
with his views on abortion: "A Roman Catholic who is the father of nine children,
Scalia is personally opposed to abortion." 311 No article appearing during the
introduction week reported on Scalia's ability to balance his parenting obligations as a
father of nine children with a successful career. When a male nominee's parental status
is covered in detail, it is portrayed as a credential or it is portrayed in the context of
reporting on the nominee's spouse. For example, in a story on Alito's parental status, a
reporter observed:
As a parent, Judge Alito appears to follow his parents' model. Hilary
Monaco, a friend and neighbor, said she and Judge Alito spent many hours
coaching the high school mock trial team. He taught the students, including
his son, Philip, the rules of evidence and how to write opening and closing
statements. In 2001, the team made it to the county semifinals-its best
performance, she said.312
An article on Roberts's difficulties having children was couched entirely in terms
of his wife, Jane Sullivan. The article, "Nominee's Wife is a Feminist After Her Own
Heart," reported that by the time Sullivan and Roberts married, "she was 42, and
Catholic doctrine prohibits most forms of fertility treatment. She and her husband went
through an 'uncertain difficult period where she wanted badly to have children,'
before they eventually adopted two infants.313 The article closed by noting that during
the week after Roberts's nomination was announced, Sullivan, "a litigator [who] then
moved on to the highly technical field of satellite procurement," found herself "too
busy to go into the office." 314 As with Scalia (and the other male nominees), no article
covered the challenge for Roberts of balancing his career and his responsibilities as a
father of two young children.
308. Ayres, supra note 282.
309. Mary McGrory, Clinton Unbridled, WASH. POST, June 17, 1993, at A2 (also noting that she was
"daughterly about her own mother, and sisterly enough to delight all but fanatical feminists").
310. Anna Quindlen, Public & Private; Ban the Bollix, Bill, N.Y. TIM ES, June 16, 1993, at A 15.
311. Ruth Marcus, Judge a Favorite with Conservative Lawyers. Activists, WASH. POST, June 18, 1986,
Al.
312. Janny Scott, Court Choice Conservative by Nature, Not Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at Al.
313. Hanna Rosin, Nominee's Wife is a Feminist After Her Own Heart, WASH. POST, July 22, 2005, at
CO 1.
314. Id. (minor punctuation omitted).
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Preliminary Finding 5: The articles are more likely to be written by male
journalists than female journalists during the introduction week.
Although this finding may appear somewhat tangentially related to our Media
Study, which focuses foremost on the nominees themselves, we wondered specifically
about who is actually constructing and framing the gendered media messages we
observed. Is there a gendered framework surrounding the coverage of nominees to the
Court? One way to assess this is to examine the extent to which male and/or female
reporters and writers are writing about the nominations. It turns out that indeed, as we
expected, there are patterns of gender inequality in journalism generally, as we
discussed in the foregoing literature review. Specifically, however, our data reveals
that, overall, the majority of the articles about Supreme Court nominees during the
introductory week are written by men. Women authored a total of twenty-two percent
of the total articles and opinion pieces we coded, whereas men authored over sixty
percent.315
Article authorship was measured using three variables to account for the first,
second, and third authors of an article. Articles in which no author was explicitly stated
due to wire service use or a name not being listed in the byline were excluded from
analysis. One-sample t-tests were then performed, with a 0.5 proportion used as the test
value. 316 Results indicate that for articles with named authors, the hypothesis that male
journalists more often authored articles was supported. Male journalists were more
likely to be first authors (n=641, t=-14.88, p<0.000) and second authors (n=132, t-4.68,
p<0.000) of the articles. Although there was not a statistically significant difference for
the third author position (n=29, t=-0.55, p=0.59), this is less important, as the majority
of articles with named authors have primarily one or two authors.
We considered whether this outcome may be attributable to the fact that our
Media Study reaches back to the early 1970s, a time when women did not comprise a
significant portion of the workforce, particularly in journalism. To test this, we
completed a separate analysis of article authorship going back until just 1990.
Somewhat surprisingly, from 1990 to 2010, only twenty-four percent of the articles
were authored by women, just two percentage points more than the dataset for the full
time period from 1971 to 2009. Further, when we look specifically at how the
authorship of the articles breaks down by nominee, we did not observe an obvious
pattern or trend toward more female authors as we moved forward in time.
Interestingly, articles about Ginsburg and Kagan were authored most frequently by
female journalists (forty-one and forty-two percent, respectively), whereas articles
about Sotomayor were authored by female journalists relatively infrequently (eighteen
percent of the time).
This finding is important to understand the context of the media framework in
which the coverage of nominees occurred. But it does not automatically signal, nor are
we suggesting, that female journalists necessarily portray the nominees in a more
315. In eighteen percent of the articles there was no author listed. These articles were subsequently
coded as "author unknown" and we were unable to make a determination of the author's gender.
316. See infra Table 2 for the results of our analysis on the differences of authorship by author position.
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positive or less gendered way. It is similar to our unwillingness to assume that female
judges automatically adjudicate from a feminist standpoint, although we argue
unequivocally that having broader, more equitable gender representation-on the bench
or in the newsroom-is an important goal.
Headline tone was also examined, and a more thorough investigation of this
variable will be conducted in subsequent phases of this research. 317 Initial analysis
conducted using a chi-square test indicates that there is a statistical relationship
between nominee sex and headline tone. Male nominees tend to receive more neutral
coverage, which in this study was defined as lacking judgment statements. As an
example, when Alito was nominated, a New York Times article headline read, "Bush
Picks U.S. Appeals Judge to Take O'Connor's Seat. '318 Conversely, female nominees
received more negative, positive, and mixed coverage. For example, an article entitled
"The Supreme Court: Woman in the News; Rejected as a Clerk, Chosen as a Justice:
Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg" 319 appeared in the New York Times; an opinion piece
entitled "Double Standard; Funny How the Achievements on Sonia Sotomayor's
Resume Suddenly Count for So Little" appeared in the Washington Post.320 And during
the most recent nomination of Elena Kagan, a headline in the New York Times read,
"Pragmatic New Yorker Chose a Careful Path to Washington."
321
The chi-square test results suggest that although female nominees are not always
portrayed negatively, they do tend to elicit more frequent judgment statements in
coverage. An additional analysis was conducted to determine if this relationship was
influenced by the sex of the author. For the initial analysis, first-author sex was used.
Two chi-square tests were conducted. The first was conducted on data for stories
authored by males. As with the first chi-square, this relationship was statistically
significant. When analyzing the female-authored stories only, however, the relationship
between nominee sex and headline tone is not statistically significant, suggesting that
there is not a strong relationship between these two variables. As a final analytical step,
the observed frequency of the male-authored chi-square test was used as the expected
frequency for the female-authored chi-square test. This relationship was once again
statistically significant, suggesting that there is a statistically significant difference
between the manner in which males and females cover Supreme Court nominees.
317. Future analysis will make use of more sophisticated nonparametric testing in order to provide
greater statistical precision.
318. Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Bush Picks U.S. Appeals Judge to Take O'Connor's Seat, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A].
319. Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: Woman in the News; Rejected as a Clerk, Chosen as a Justice:
Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at Al.
320. Editorial, Double Standard; Funny How the Achievements on Sonia Sotomayor's Resume Suddenly
Count for So Little, WASH. POST, June 2,2009, at A14.
321. Sheryl Gay Stolberg et al., Pragmatic New Yorker Chose a Careful Path to Washington, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2010, at Al.
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B. Observations
1. The Complexities of (Non)Motherhood and Appearance/Competence
Perhaps somewhat naively, we hoped to find that media coverage evolved since
the nominations of O'Connor and Ginsburg to become less gender focused, though we
speculated that this was unlikely to be the case based upon the anecdotal headlines that
appeared during the nominations of Sotomayor and Kagan that inspired us to take on
this Media Study in the first place. The data comparing coverage during the
introduction weeks for O'Connor and Ginsburg versus Miers, Sotomayor, and Kagan is
interesting. We found a significant reduction in the average number of articles about
the nominees' marital status; an average of twenty-three articles for O'Connor and
Ginsburg compared to an average of ten articles for the most recent female nominees.
The mention of parental status similarly dropped from an average of eleven articles to
an average of five articles. We also found a more modest reduction in the average
number of articles related to appearance or referencing the nominees' gender, from ten
to eight and fifty-four to forty-two, respectively.
Two increases are also notable. During the O'Connor and Ginsburg introduction
weeks, the average number of articles referencing sexual orientation was two,
compared to an average of ten articles for Miers, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The
percentage of male reporters also increased, from fifty-four percent to sixty-seven
percent.
Although these statistics might be cause for celebration, at least to the extent they
document a reduction in the number of articles focusing on a nominee's
parental/marital status, appearance, or gender, we are reluctant to take such a position.
We remain concerned about the quantity and content of coverage devoted to
(non)motherhood, appearance, and competence of female nominees, and we are
troubled by the increased attention to the sexual orientation and marital status of single,
female nominees. It is one thing to discuss a nominee's family life in the context of
background, but quite another to discuss it as a (dis)qualification for becoming a
Supreme Court Justice. The next phases of our research will explore these distinctions
further in order to evaluate such concerns. Moreover, the results from our Media Study
during the introduction week support the observations we made at the beginning of this
Article, where we suggested that the double binds related to motherhood and
appearance identified by Frye and Jamieson persist today but manifest in increasingly
complex and difficult ways.322 We suspect that if this is the case for the women who
are nominated for such a powerful legal position, it is likely true for most, if not all,
women lawyers as they seek to advance in their careers.
Although male and female nominees alike received coverage about their parental
status, motherhood (or nonmotherhood) took on a special role in the news reports about
the female nominees. For Sotomayor, and especially Kagan, nonmotherhood was
presented as a possible basis for disqualification. No male nominees were subject to a
similar kind of critique based upon their decision about whether or not to become a
322. See supra Part II.A.l.c.i.-ii for a discussion of the double binds related to motherhood and
appearance.
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parent. With appearance, not only did the media cover the appearance of female
nominees more frequently but the nature of the coverage differed based upon gender,
particularly when considering the association of appearance and competence. Our
Media Study revealed ways that media scrutinizes the competency of female nominees
more closely and "assessed by stricter standards than those applied to men."323 For
example, the opinion piece "The Nomination of Mrs. O'Connor" declared that
"[r]arely, if ever, has a president reached so far down into the state judiciary to find a
Supreme Court justice. Most of them have come from higher ranks of the judicial
system, from national political positions or from the nationally known law firms."
324
The piece, although generally expressing praise for the President's pick, and
acknowledging the plight of women lawyers, nonetheless fails to address O'Connor's
potential for success, instead leveraging criticism against her less-than-perfect
professional credentials. Contrast this criticism with another article, in which a reporter
characterizes O'Connor's visits to meet senators before the confirmation hearings as if
she was a debutant at a ball. 32 5 Paula Monopoli's description of Miers' withdrawal
from the nomination process is also revealing. Monopoli characterizes the withdrawal
as a historical moment, highlighting the profound gender bias still at play in the
nomination process and in society generally: "[N]ominees are increasingly required to
be 'brilliant' graduates of an elite law school and sitting United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals judges. Women who are brilliant are rarely characterized as such. Rather they
are described as 'hard-working,' 'good managers' or 'well-organized."' 326 Of all the
female nominees, the coverage of Miers's appearance was particularly harsh, especially
when viewed in light of coverage about her competence.
2. The Untold Stories of Women Not Nominated
As we reflected upon the significance of our preliminary findings, we could not
help but notice the contrast between contemporary media discourse on gender and the
Supreme Court (which focuses primarily on the four women who are serving or have
served as justices), and media discourse from nearly half a century ago (which focused,
significantly, on women who were short-listed but not nominated). To be sure, media
in the twenty-first century examines all short-listed Supreme Court candidates, male
and female alike. But we became captivated by the fact that modem media quickly
forgets about the other candidates once a nominee is announced, particularly in light of
the fact that coverage of the Powell and Rehnquist nominations included a notable
amount of press devoted to the "rejected" candidates. We also noticed that modem
reporters and commentators frequently retell O'Connor's story as the first woman to
serve on the Court, followed by a discussion of the three successful nominees in the
wake of her legacy. Our Media Study, however, reveals an important story line that
does not get retold. A decade before O'Connor's nomination, President Nixon
323. Williams, supra note 81, at 413.
324. Editorial, supra note 243.
325. Lynn Rosellini, Jr., Judge O'Connor Makes Courtesy Call at Capitol; Attorney General William
French Smith, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1981, at A]9 (O'Connor was asked whether her Capitol Hill rounds made
her "feel a bit like a debutante, being introduced to all these people").
326. Monopoli, supra note 31, at 62 (footnote omitted).
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contemplated a bold move; on his shortlist of nominees appeared the name of Mildred
Lillie, a judge from California.
Lillie ultimately was not nominated to the Court, 327 but a rich media conversation
about women and the Court played out on the pages of the New York Times and
Washington Post, a conversation we uncovered in our research. The media reported a
deflated sentiment felt by women at the time President Nixon announced his choice for
the Court: "Disappointment, laced with resignation, was the mood last night among
3,000 Republican women over President Nixon's failure to appoint the first woman to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 328 Another article, "President Bypasses Women for Court;
Talent Pool Small," reflected on the lack of women lawyers available as candidates,
speculating that females were not hired or promoted by law firms for a variety of
reasons: "they'll only get pregnant and leave"; "[w]omen cannot be used in courtroom
work; they are too shrill; juries do not like them"; "[w]omen just cannot stand the strain
of litigation; they fall apart"; and that "[c]orporate law work requires long trips out of
town, and long sessions at night in hotel rooms, writing briefs and otherwise preparing
cases. The partners' wives would not stand for women in such jobs."329
The same disappointment felt by women in 1971 was reflected in media coverage
over twenty years later when President Clinton selected Stephen Breyer as his nominee
to the Court. Since there were two women already serving on the Court, the
appointment of a white male likely came as no surprise. Perhaps more notably,
however, is the fact that there were no women who even appeared on Clinton's short
list of potential nominees in 1994. An opinion piece in the New York Times illuminated
this issue: "Another white male on the Court increases Mr. Clinton's obligation to
bring more women and racial minorities into the selection process in the future. We
find it hard to believe there were no qualified candidates in these categories good
enough to make the finals this time." 3
30
After learning of Mildred Lillie's failed nomination, we became curious about her
story and those of other women who were short-listed but never nominated to the
Court. We discovered that until President Obama took office (and subsequently
nominated two women to the Court, making 100% of his nominations women), a total
of fourteen women were formally short-listed, the first being Soia Mentschikoff in
327. Lillie's fate was determined by the American Bar Association's Committee on the Federal
Judiciary, which deemed her unqualified to serve on the Court. See James M. Naughton, Early Vote Asked:
President Asserts His Nominees Epitomize Conservative Views, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1971, at 1. President
Nixon's counsel during the nomination process, John Dean, later stated in an interview that
Mildred Lillie was every bit, if not more, qualified to be a Justice than Day O'Connor. But what
happened was the American Bar Association at that time was made up of all men and the old boys
did not think that it was time for a woman to be on the high court. But the principal person who
really objected to Nixon selecting a woman was none other than the Chief Justice himself, Warren
Burger, who threatened that he would resign if Nixon put a woman on the court.
American RadioWorks, Interview by Kate Ellis with John Dean, AM. PUB. MEDIA, http://Americanradioworks.
publicradio.org/features/prestapes/johndean.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (paragraph break omitted).
328. Dorothy McCardle, GOP Women: Resigned, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1971, at B2.
329. Shanahan, supra note 49.
330. Editorial, Another New Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at 20.
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1965 by President Johnson. 33 1 But these women were not nominated, and their stories
have gone largely untold. We intend to bring their stories to life through a forthcoming
project inspired by our Media Study.332
It is also noteworthy that in the Nixon era, the media discourse reflected fairly
explicit bias, contemplating whether a woman ought to serve on the Court in the first
place or whether a qualified woman might even exist to assume such a powerful
position. Today, illustrated most recently by the nominations of Sotomayor and Kagan,
such explicit bias is just about nonexistent. It has been replaced, however, with more
subtle shades of bias that tend to center around often interrelated issues of motherhood,
competency, and appearance. The pervasiveness of these three kinds of bias is
evidenced in the first phase of our Media Study, and we predict that our subsequent
research will offer further support.
IV. CONCLUSION
"[T]he first step in getting power is to become visible to others .... " -
Sandra Day O'Connor
333
Perhaps no other female lawyer is better situated to offer guidance on the
acquisition of power within the profession than O'Connor. In an era where women
simply did not exist in the legal profession, let alone hold positions of power, she
adeptly navigated the power pipeline as an editor of the Stanford Law Review, as the
first female majority leader in the Arizona state senate, and, ultimately, as the first
woman Supreme Court Justice. She connects visibility with power. But what does it
mean to be visible? Are women now visible in the legal profession given that they
comprise half of law graduates? Are women now visible in the profession given that
they comprise one-third of the Supreme Court Justices? If the answer to both of these
questions is yes, then why do women remain disproportionately excluded from the
legal profession's positions of power? We submit that the relationship between
visibility and power is complex, and power is not achieved merely by being present.
The results from Phase One of our research, focusing exclusively on the
nominee's introduction to the public by the press, reveal an ongoing struggle for equal
access to and ascension in the power pipeline for women in the legal profession that is
linked to motherhood, appearance, and competence. This revelation, which emerges
during the limited window of the nominees' introductory weeks, invites further study.
We anticipate similar if not even more illuminating results during the next phases of
our Supreme Court Media Study. We conclude that the media depiction of Supreme
Court nominees offers an alternative, valuable mechanism for evaluating gender
equality in the legal profession's pipeline to power.
331. See NEMACHECK, supra note 186, app. at 150.
332. We will explore the stories of these women in a forthcoming work, tentatively titled Not
Nominated. We see this work as responsive to Kathleen Hall Jamieson's call for "recovering" as a solution to
the double binds faced by women in leadership. She writes: "Recovery of the history of women's lives and
accomplishments reminds us of the progress women have made and the means they have employed."
JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 191.
333. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW, REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
201 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003).
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APPENDIX
Table 1. List of Nominees, Nomination Period, and Number of Articles
Appearing During the Introduction Week
N IIMRI R (W1 AnkTIcIF rhIRING INTROlMICTIAN WF K
lol. 84
NOMINEE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCEMENT CONFIRMATION TOTAL
DATE DATE/WITHDRAWAL ARTICLES
Kagan Obama May 10, 2010 Aug. 4,2010 57
Sotomayor Obama May 27, 2009 Aug. 6, 2009 78
Alito Bush Nov. 1, 2005 Jan. 31, 2006 68
Miers Bush Oct. 4, 2005 Oct. 28, 2005 62
Roberts Bush July 19, 2005 Sept. 6, 2005 98
Breyer Clinton May 13, 1994 July 29, 1994 26
Ginsburg Clinton June 14, 1993 Aug. 3, 1993 44
Thomas Bush July 1, 1991 Oct. 15, 1991 57
Souter Bush July 23, 1990 Oct. 2, 1990 55
Kennedy Reagan Nov. 11, 1987 Feb. 3, 1998 25
Bork Reagan July 1, 1987 Oct. 23, 1987 43
Scalia Reagan June 18, 1986 Sept. 17, 1986 44
O'Connor Reagan July 7, 1981 Sept. 21, 1981 30
Stevens Ford Nov. 28, 1975 Dec. 17, 1975 21
Powell Nixon Oct. 22, 1971 Dec. 10, 1971 29
Rehnquist Nixon Oct. 22, 1971 Dec. 6, 1971 37
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TABLE 2. DIFFERENCES OF AUTHORSHIP BY AUTHOR POSITION
Author Position Mean (SD) Mean Difference t-value df
First 0.754 (0.43) 0.254 14.881** 640
Second 0.689 (0.46) 0.189 4.684*** 131
Third 0.552 (0.51) 0.052 0.550 28
Note.***p<0.001, two-tailed. Authors were dummy coded with female=0. Test Value
was 0.5.
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF STORIES AND WORD COUNT BY NOMINEE SEX
Female Male Mean t-value(df)
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Difference
Number of 54.2(18.2) 47.7(23.1) 6.5 0.546(13)
Stories
Word Count 1,081.4(699.8) 959.1(721) 122.3 2.112(680)*
per Storyt
Note. *p<0.05, two-tailed. tNominees without this variable removed from analysis
TABLE 4. MENTIONS OF NOMINEE APPEARANCE BY NOMINEE SEX
Female Male Mean t-value(df)
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Difference
General 1.10(0.392) 1.08(0.358) 0.027 0.914(656)
Appearance
Adornment 1.03(0.191) 1.04(0.260) 0.014 -0.751(656)
Physical Traits 1.08(0.347) 1.05(0.265) 0.036 1.419(474.3)
Body Posture 1.01(0.149) 1.01(0.134) 0.005 -0.487(656)
Picture Present 1.42(0.502) 1.31(0.426) 0.108 2.771(530.8)***
Note. ***p<0.001, one-tailed.
TABLE 5. MENTIONS OF NOMINEE FAMILY LIFE BY NOMINEE SEX
Female Male Mean t-value(df)
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Difference
Marital 1.21(0.588) 1.20(0.538) 0.011 0.239(657)
Status
Parental 1.10(0.410) 1.06(0.276) 0.045 1.568(433.2)
Status
Note. *p<0.05, one-tailed.
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